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Because of his public leadership of the philosophe party in eighteenth-
century France, Voltaire stands today as the iconic example of the French
Enlightenment philosopher. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) is often seen as
Voltaire’s second in that role since it was around both men that the
Enlightenment philosophes rallied as a movement after 1750. The epochal
project, which Diderot jointly pursued with Jean le Rond D’Alembert, to
“change the common way of thinking” through a comprehensive
Encyclopedia, or Reasoned Dictionary of the Arts, Sciences, and Trades
provided the emergent philosophe movement with the cause around which
they would coalesce. Diderot also fought vigorously with Voltaire on
behalf of the Encyclopédie project and its principles, becoming as a result
a public leader of the Enlightenment philosophical party in France
alongside Voltaire. He also worked, like Voltaire, as a writer and critical
intellectual who willingly positioned himself against the grain of
established authority, and one who used philosophy as a vehicle for
political and social activism. Yet Diderot’s philosophy pursued many more
agendas and dimensions than Voltaire’s. He also left behind a corpus of
philosophical writings that marks him out as arguably the most
sophisticated of all the Enlightenment philosophes, and as one of the great
philosophical thinkers of the eighteenth-century.
Despite the obvious sophistication of Diderot’s philosophy, his legacy has
suffered because of the historical differences separating his writings from
the discipline of philosophy as it is practiced today. Enlightenment
philosophie was something very different from what professional
academic philosophers mean by that term today, and Diderot’s writings are
often ignored by modern philosophers because they do not appear to be
philosophy as they know it. Like many Enlightenment philosophes,
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Diderot also worked as an homme de lettres first and foremost, and only as
a philosopher narrowly construed in certain instances. He also never
authored any recognizable work of “systematic philosophy” if by that term
we mean writing in the vein of his contemporaries such as David Hume in
his Treatise or Immanuel Kant in his Critiques.
Yet Diderot made important contributions to modern philosophy, and if
they are to be grasped, the historical differences separating his writing
from philosophy today must be transcended, and his eclectic manner of
working accepted and embraced. Diderot wrote works that we recognize
today as philosophy, but he also wrote a great deal more than that, and the
challenge presented by his eighteenth-century philosophie is to see the
modern philosophy contained in all of it. For Diderot did not simply write
plays, art criticism, prose fictions, and highly imaginative works of
literature alongside his work in philosophy; he pursued philosophie
through these ostensibly literary works as well. He experimented with
genres, including philosophical genres, when crafting his thought, and his
writing overall is redolent with a self-consciousness that makes any easy
separation of his explicitly philosophical writings from his literary work
well-nigh impossible. His publishing habits were similarly complex, for as
a writer who suffered personally under censorship that made the traffic in
illicit ideas a prosecutable offense in Old Regime France, Diderot often
had very good reason to leave his work unpublished—and very often did.
At the same time, censorship alone does not explain the peculiar mix of
published and unpublished writings found in Diderot’s oeuvre.
This historical complexity has given rise to some difficulty in assessing
Diderot’s writings according to the disciplinary canon of modern
philosophy. Condillac, Helvétius, and d’Holbach are the Enlightenment
philosophes most commonly studied within philosophy departments
because their writings appear to conform better with conventional
understandings of what philosophy should look like as a genre and a
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linguistic idiom. By contrast, the works of Diderot tend to be studied only
in literature or history departments. This is unfortunate, for the treatment
of Diderot’s philosophie as something different from modern philosophy
has cut contemporary philosophers off from the work of one of the most
sophisticated, subtle, and complex philosophical thinkers of the eighteenth
century.
To some extent, the way in which Diderot’s philosophical work employs
different genres but also, challenges the idea of genre itself, has made it
seem (perhaps too easily) congenial to a more “Continental” philosophical
tradition, and foreign to a more formally oriented “analytic” tradition. But
that would ignore Diderot’s naturalistic commitments and the role the
Encyclopédie played, e.g., in the self-image of philosophers of science in
the Vienna Circle. Our entry seeks to go beyond such oppositions in
dealing with Diderot as a philosopher.
Neither perspective alone fully grasps the richness of Diderot’s
contributions to modern philosophy, so in order to fully situate his
philosophie within philosophy writ large, a flexible and reflexive attitude
regarding his writings must be adopted. Every text in Diderot’s oeuvre
needs to be treated as a participant in both his philosophie and his
philosophical work, and our conventional understanding of the boundaries
isolating art and literature from science and philosophy also needs to be
suspended because very often these modern distinctions do not apply in
Diderot’s case. He also manifests an awareness of the new and emergent
disciplinary taxonomy arising at the time, targeting his philosophie on
many occasions at an interrogation of these developing epistemological
divisions. This reflexivity often makes his thought even more relevant
today than it was when it was written.
To capture the complexity of Diderot’s philosophie as philosophy, this
article adopts this reflexive approach. It will proceed in two parts. An
Charles T. Wolfe and J.B. Shank
Summer 2019 Edition 3
overview of Diderot’s life and major texts is offered in Part I so as to
present his work and writings as particular episodes in a coherent
eighteenth-century life and career. To simplify the reading of this
biography, the text is offered in a two-level presentation. A short overview
of the highlights of Diderot’s life and work is offered in Section 1 to give
readers a schematic overview, but a more extensive presentation of his
biography is available in the Biographical Supplement. A comprehensive
analysis of Diderot’s major philosophical preoccupations as revealed in his
writings is then offered in Section 2 so as to outline the contours of
Diderot’s place within Enlightenment philosophie and modern philosophy
overall. This is followed by brief concluding remarks in Section 3.
1. Diderot’s Life and Major Writings
1.1 Years of Formation and Struggle (1713–1749)
1.2 Ascendance as Writer and Philosophe through the
Encyclopédie (1750–1765)
1.3 The Years of Celebrity (1765–1763)
1.4 Twilight Years (1773–1784)
2. Major Themes of Diderot’s Philosophy
2.1 Skepticism, eclecticism and language
2.2 Radicalizing empiricism
2.2.1 Empiricism, from epistemology to ontology
2.2.2 Empiricism and experimentalism
2.2.3 An experimental metaphysics
2.3 Materialism, science and living matter
2.3.1 Vital materialism as “modern Spinozism”
2.3.2 Matter theory and living matter
2.3.3 Body and embodiment
2.4 Determinism and change
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2.5.2 Philosophy of language and representation
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1. Diderot’s Life and Major Writings
Diderot’s long, varied, and eventful life can be presented in four distinct
phases:
1. a period of maturation amidst struggle in the 1730s–40s as the
impoverished young Diderot sought to establish himself as a writer in
Old Regime Paris through the pursuit of the highly precarious
vocation of writing and publishing;
2. a period of intellectual ascent after 1749 as Diderot used the new
financial stability and intellectual notoriety acquired by editing the
Encyclopédie to build a base for his mature career as an
Enlightenment writer, critic, and philosophe;;
3. a period of intellectual celebrity as the new freedom brought about by
the completion of the Encyclopédie in 1765 allowed Diderot to
produce some of his most important, if often unpublished, work;
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4. a twilight period begun in 1773 after his financial burdens were fully
eliminated through Empress Catherine the Great of Russia’s lucrative
patronage, when Diderot brought to completion the wider
philosophical program established earlier, with an additional
dimension of political radicalism.
1.1 Years of Formation and Struggle (1713–1749)
Born to an artisan cutler in 1713 in Langres, a city 300 kilometers
southeast of Paris, Diderot began his life with very little pointing him
toward his future as a world-renowned writer and intellectual. His first
steps were supported by a university education under the supervision of
the Jesuits and training in scholastic philosophy and theology through the
M.A. level.
Having moved to Paris as a teenager to pursue his studies, Diderot began
to forge his career as a piece writer in the vibrant but economically
constrained world of Parisian publishing. D’Alembert would later
romanticize the life of the poor but fully independent writer as an ideal to
which all honnêtes gens de lettres should aspire, and Diderot actually lived
the impoverished bohemian writer’s life in the flesh. During the 1730s, he
struggled continuously to eke out a minimal existence through occasional
work with his pen, especially finding work as a translator, and his financial
hardship was increased after his marriage in 1743 to an equally poor
woman and the arrival of a daughter soon thereafter.
In the 1740s, poor and still marginal, Diderot began to build the career as a
writer and intellectual that would make him famous. In 1742, he met the
young Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a key moment in the genesis of the
philosophe movement, which Rousseau immortalized for posterity in his
Confessions. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac also joined their circle at this
time. Diderot further began to write and publish his own books in this
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period, establishing his name and reputation as a philosophical author, one
who was perennially associated with the most radical and controversial
ideas.
Key works from this period include a very loose translation of
Shaftesbury’s An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit, in which Diderot
turns moral sense theory into a kind of aesthetics of Nature; Pensées
philosophiques, a work of provocative philosophical propositions
concerning matter, motion, nature and science; La Promenade du
sceptique, a philosophical dialogue which was written in this period but
only published a century later; and Les Bijoux indiscrets, which is best
described as philosophical pornography.
The climax of Diderot’s prolific decade occurred in 1749 with the
publication of Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient, one of
Diderot’s masterpieces and arguably his most sophisticated and complex
philosophical text after Le Rêve de D’Alembert and Le Neveu de Rameau.
The Lettre, which presents itself as a series of reflections on the blind
mathematician Nicholas Saunderson, is perhaps best described by Diderot
biographer Arthur N. Wilson as “disarming” (1972: 97).
Diderot’s public intellectual acclaim increased with each of these books,
and by the time of the Lettre sur les aveugles he had become famous
enough for Voltaire himself, already the public face of radical philosophie,
to write to Diderot praising his books. But the same acclaim that attracted
Voltaire’s attention also rendered Diderot suspicious in the eyes of the
French authorities. A police file with Diderot’s name on it was opened
soon after the Pensées philosophiques appeared, and this work was
ordered to be publicly burned in July 1746. By 1749, the evidence
pointing to Diderot’s authorship of these subversive (potentially or
explicitly atheistic) works was conclusive, and after the publication of the
Lettre sur les aveugles an order was issued ordering Diderot’s
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incarceration in Vincennes prison. He was imprisoned for three months
starting in July 1749, before being released the following November.
1.2 Ascendance as Writer and Philosophe through the
Encyclopédie (1750–1765)
When Diderot was released from prison in November 1749, he was
already at work on a new project, the one that would launch him to global
intellectual fame.
Begun in 1745 as a project to publish a complete French translation of
Ephraim Chambers’ 1728 Cyclopedia, or Universal Dictionary of Arts and
Sciences, the Encyclopédie, arguably the single most transformative work
of the French Enlightenment, had become by 1749 something entirely
new. Breaking free of the translation agenda, a new work was imagined, to
be edited by Diderot and D’Alembert, that would serve as the vehicle
promoting the new philosophie.
In November 1750, Diderot released a “Prospectus” for the Encyclopédie,
inviting readers to subscribe to a new multivolume compendium. In this
preview, Diderot began to reveal his conception of what the Encyclopédie
would become. No longer a translation of someone else’s book, and even
less a staid compendium of already established learning, Diderot imagined
the Encyclopédie as a dynamic site of living thought, an engine for
changing, not codifying, existing knowledge. These ideas were further
developed in Diderot’s article “Encyclopédie”, which was published in
volume V of the work in 1755.
The middle of the eighteenth century has appeared to many as a watershed
moment in French intellectual history. As a nineteenth-century
commentator put it, after this date “writings hostile to religion appeared
and multiplied, and a war broke out between skepticism and faith”
(Wilson 1972: 94–95, quoting an editor of Barbier 1857: vol. 4, p. 378, fn.
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1). Whatever the prior preparation, the launch of the Encyclopédie at
precisely this moment fueled this dynamic, and it quickly provoked a war
between its editors and the religious authorities in France. At the heart of
the struggle were the Jesuits, especially Guillaume-François Berthier, who
used the Jesuit journal to attack the new encyclopedia project and its
editors. Diderot responded with pamphlets, and this sparring continued as
the first two volumes of the Encyclopédie appeared in print.
The tension with French clerical authorities worsened when the abbé de
Prades, a friend of Diderot’s and contributor to the Encyclopédie—he
wrote the entry “Certitude”—successfully defended what was later
deemed to be a theologically suspect doctoral thesis. The controversy led
the crown to temporarily suspend the publication privilège for the
Encyclopédie, but thanks to the favor that Diderot and his partners enjoyed
in higher places, publication was resumed and Volumes II–VI appeared
without pause between 1751–1756 even though accompanied by ongoing
criticism from the Jesuits.
New controversies over the Encyclopédie occurred in 1757, although the
return of unrest had little overtly to do with philosophie. The trigger was
an attempt on King Louis XV’s life by a house servant named Damiens,
who stabbed the king with a small penknife. The act of regicide itself was
less significant for the Encyclopédie than the perceived motivation for the
crime, for authorities began to link Damiens’s purported madness to the
unchecked spread of subversive philosophie. Provoked by these public
fears, French authorities issued new edicts cracking down on allegedly
subversive books, and new works critical of the Encyclopédie also
appeared, generating the idea of an “Encyclopedist party” organized for
the purpose of attacking morality, religion and government. When Volume
VII appeared soon after Damiens’s attack, the tinder was therefore set for
a new eruption of controversy.
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The controversy grew intense, leading D’Alembert to resign as editor,
putting Diderot in sole control of the project. The final blow against the
Encyclopédie occurred in July 1758 when Claude-Adrien Helvétius
published On the Mind (De l’Esprit), one of the most overtly materialist
and heterodox works of the French Enlightenment. Although Helvétius
was not technically an encyclopédiste, he certainly moved in the same
circles, and his work fit comfortably with the imaginary template of
subversive materialist philosophie that crystallized after the Damiens
Affair. Accordingly, as the officials in charge of securing public order,
morality, and the book trade—the three were one in absolutist France—
began to crack down on Helvétius and De l’Esprit, the Encyclopédie found
itself pulled into the courts as a supposed accomplice aiding and abetting
its crimes.
Thanks to a secretive ad hoc agreement, however, work on the final ten
volumes of the Encyclopédie was allowed to continue, leading to the full
publication of the work in 1765 with each of the volumes falsely
indicating a publication in Neuchâtel as a way of complying with the royal
ban. During the same years, the volumes of accompanying plates appeared
since they were not subject to the ban, and by 1772 the final volumes of
the plates were published to accompany the seventeen volumes of text that
were already in print. With that the entire Encyclopédie was brought to
completion.
1.3 The Years of Celebrity (1765–1763)
In 1765, after the final appearance of all text volumes of the Encyclopédie,
Diderot experienced a kind of liberation as his life was freed from the
work that had occupied most of his time and energy over the previous
fifteen years. During the 1760s, Diderot continued to do what was
necessary to see the Encyclopédie project completed, ultimately authoring
nearly six thousand articles himself. But he was also gradually able to step
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back, retreating in some respects to the background of the philosophe
movement. With this liberation, a highly productive period in his life
began as new and original books began to flow from his pen.
Diderot’s earliest writings from this period, pursued while the
Encyclopédie project was still ramping up to full speed, continued the
philosophical and literary explorations initiated in the 1740s. Taken as a
whole they reflect his lifelong preoccupation with questions of life, liberty,
purpose, and order within an Epicurean cosmos that may not be governed
by a providential creator, along with his continuing interest in the
epistemological problem of discerning the nature and principles of such a
world, especially as they related to the emerging biological sciences of the
eighteenth century. Key works in this vein include Lettre sur les sourds et
muets à l’usage de ceux qui entendent et qui parlent, a continuation of
sorts to his Lettre sur les aveugles, and Pensées sur l’interprétation de la
nature, a work that retains the episodic, propositional structure of his
Pensées philosophiques while expanding the explanations within each
section.
Scholars have also suggested, though never proven definitively, that
Diderot contributed during these years to Baron d’Holbach’s Système de la
Nature, first published in 1770, a book that stands alongside Helvétius’ De
l’Esprit as one of the great masterpieces of French Enlightenment
materialist philosophy. Diderot was certainly at the center of the
D’Holbach’s coterie, and if the dry and programmatic systematicity of
D’Holbach’s book lacks the lively play of Diderot’s best philosophical
writing, it is certain that he and the Baron were kindred spirits.
One of Diderot’s great masterpieces, written during these years but only
published posthumously, should be included as a part of the natural-
philosophical corpus summarized above, even if it engages with these
seminal questions of metaphysics and natural philosophy in an overtly
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literary manner, drawing more on Enlightenment epistolary novels and
theater for its construction than the classical philosophical genres of
antique philosophy (although one should recall that Plato wrote
dialogues).
Called Le Rêve de D’Alembert (D’Alembert’s Dream), the work is in fact a
trilogy of dialogues whose centerpiece provides the title. This complex
text reveals some of Diderot’s most important thinking about metaphysics
as it relates to biology and the life sciences. Although it was never
published in Diderot’s lifetime, it was nevertheless one of his favorite
works, and he gave one copy to Catherine the Great as a gift, together,
significantly in terms of his understanding of the work, with a set of
“Fragments” that he presented as belonging to his physiological writings.
The dialogues would certainly have been considered a subversive work
had they been published when they were written, and whatever Diderot’s
motivations in producing it as he did, the creative complexity converges
into what is without question one of the great masterpieces of
Enlightenment philosophie.
The same combination of literature and philosophy, textual play and
reasoned argumentation present in Le Rêve de D’Alembert is also present
in Diderot’s other seemingly literary and artistic writings, which also
contain much serious science and philosophy.
One important cluster concerns the theory and practice of theater. Diderot
wrote scripts for plays that were staged in Paris, including Le Fils naturel
in 1757 and Le père de famille in 1758. These were moralizing
melodramas advocating the ethical value of the conjugal family and the
virtues of thrift, domestic love and piety. His plays are not major
touchstones in the history of theater, but his meta-theoretical writings
about theater itself, which provide many interesting points of departure for
his philosophy, are important contributions to aesthetic theory. Diderot’s
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novels and other works of overt fiction also partake in the aesthetic
explorations that mark his best work on the theater. In both, Diderot
manifests an interest in the nature and limits of representation itself, and a
self-aware consciousness regarding the tenuous interaction between
language, experience, and their ability to merge (or not) into coherent
representations. These are issues that are present in all of Diderot’s most
sophisticated thought, including his more explicitly framed philosophy.
Diderot displayed the same philosophical-literary tendencies in his art
criticism. His work in this area began in 1759 when the journalist F.M.
Grimm invited Diderot to contribute to his monthly journal
Correspondence Littéraire with reflections on the art displayed at the
biennial Parisian art salon. Staged in the Louvre, these shows allowed
painters and sculptors to showcase their work in a setting that gave a broad
public audience access to the work of the best artists of the day. Others
had written commentaries about the exhibitions before, but no one before
Diderot had provided anything like the critical philosophical assessment of
the art of the salons.
A new academically centered art theory had developed in the seventeenth
century, and by 1700 it was joined by a new persona, the connoisseur, who
was helping collectors to hone their judgment when separating truly great
art from mere craft. The bi-annual Parisian salons had already become a
site of Enlightenment aesthetics and connoisseurship by 1750, yet before
Diderot no one had brought together the job of the connoisseur and the
aesthetician with that of the public writer reflecting on art in relation to
ordinary human experience. In his “Salons”, as they came to be called,
Diderot brought all of these agendas together into one discursive program,
inventing as a result a new identity: the art critic sustained through
contemporary art criticism. The result was also a new and pioneering
notion of philosophy of art.
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Diderot’s art criticism explored exactly the same dynamics between form
and content, author and interpreter, subject and object—in short, the very
problem of artistic representation itself—that his theater, his fiction, and
his philosophy explored as well. The result was a general understanding of
aesthetics and its relationship to ethics that was integrally connected to his
philosophy overall.
Diderot’s art criticism joined with his theater criticism, his prose and other
theoretical writings in offering readers reflections on deep metaphysical
and epistemological questions concerning the power and limits of
representation. From this perspective, it is appropriate that arguably
Diderot’s greatest and most influential text is at once a literary fiction, a
semi-autobiographical psychological memoir, a theatrical send-up of
Parisian society, an intimate portrait of contemporary social mores, and a
highly original and complex study of the nature of human perception,
being, and their interrelation.
Called Le Neveu de Rameau, the text ostensibly narrates Diderot’s
meetings and conversation with the nephew of the French composer Jean-
Philippe Rameau. Yet the dialogue unfolds through a back and forth
between characters named “Moi” and “Lui”, or me and him, continually
turning a discussion between two discrete subjects into an inner
monologue of one subject dialoguing with himself. Indeed, as the
exchange carries on, the two characters are revealed to be different sides
of a deep existential dialectic. At this point the external reality of the
characters begins to dissolve, and “Moi” and “Lui” start to become two
competing principles within an intractable universal ethical and
metaphysical struggle.
Diderot did not publish Le Neveu de Rameau in his lifetime, but the text
found its way to Germany where it was read by Schiller and Goethe.
Goethe’s German translation, published in 1805, was a major influence on
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Hegel: the Neveu is the only modern work explicitly cited in his 1807
Phenomenology of Spirit. Indeed, its influence on the formation of Hegel’s
own dialectical understanding of metaphysics and the nature of being is
patent, and a line connects Diderot and the Neveu with all subsequent
metaphysical understandings of the self as a singularity caught in a
constant struggle with universal forces pulling the unity of being apart.
1.4 Twilight Years (1773–1784)
Further helping Diderot after 1765 was the generosity of Catherine the
Great of Russia, and his trip to her court in St. Petersburg in 1773 marks
the passage of Diderot into the final stages of his career.
Catherine watched the development of the Encyclopédie project with great
interest and expressed affection for French Enlightenment philosophie
overall. Fate provided her with an occasion to express her appreciation
directly to Diderot when a financial burden forced him to sell his library.
Catherine made the purchase, giving Diderot an annual pension in
addition. This made him a wealthy man for the rest of his life. Diderot
traveled to St. Petersburg to meet with Catherine in 1773–74, and this trip
marks his entrance into a leisured retirement in Paris where he continued
to write.
Diderot’s last writings continued themes pursued throughout his life, but
one new interest was history. His Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de
Néron, which turned interest in ethics and morality toward questions of
politics, justice, and history, was one result, as were his contributions to
the final edition of the abbé Raynal’s massive, nineteen-volume global
history entitled Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et
du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes.
The latter was produced by Raynal in a manner similar to the
Encyclopédie, with numerous authors contributing. The resulting work
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was a pioneering world history defined by its argument that the
transformations triggered by the Colombian Encounter were the decisive
agent of world historical development. Diderot’s contributions included
explorations of the role of commerce, conceived as an autonomous
natural-historical force, in the shaping of political and social change, a
theme that connects Diderot’s writing with the new sciences of
Enlightenment political economy. The Atlantic slave trade also attracted
his attention, and some of his most passionate contributions involve
imagined dialogues about the horrors of the European imperial slave
system spoken by oppressed Africans. Raynal’s Histoire was a massive
bestseller, translated into many languages, and it was a direct influence on
Hegel, Marx, and through both on modern world history more generally.
Diderot’s contribution to this influence was as important as any.
Diderot’s contributions to Raynal’s Histoire have been described as proto-
anthropological, and another provocative work from these years, his
Supplément au voyage de Bougainville, was similarly conceived and
influential. The text offers an imagined dialogue between Tahitians and
Europeans about the different sexual, marital and familial mores of the
two cultures, and Diderot anticipates through fiction the figure of the
native ethnographer who asks comparative questions about the
foundations of morality and civilization so as to generate universal cultural
understandings through comparison.
In these texts, and others from these years such as his Observations sur le
“Nakaz”, a commentary on Catherine’s Enlightened reform program for
Russia, Diderot appears in a newly radical political guise as an aggressive
egalitarian and democrat who has little patience with traditional
justifications for hierarchy and top-down distributions of power. He is also
a passionate abolitionist with no tolerance for the crimes of the Atlantic
slave trade. Nature does not work through hierarchy, Diderot insists in
these texts, and connecting politics with his natural philosophy he argues
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for a radical decentralization of political authority, and a fully bottom-up,
egalitarian understanding of social order. These convictions are also
manifest in his thinking about race and slavery. He rejected altogether the
new anthropology promulgated by Kant and others that spoke of
biologically and civilizationally distinct races, offering instead a
monogenetic understanding of humanity where difference was a matter of
degree rather than kind. Diderot was by nature a writer and thinker, not a
political activist, and his political philosophy, while suggestive of
emerging radical political trends, appears as the least developed aspect of
his thought.
When revolution erupted in France in 1789, the memory of Voltaire and
Rousseau led to their inclusion in the pantheon of revolutionary heroes
worthy of immortal commemoration. Diderot, by contrast, was at best
forgotten and at worst treated as a figure hostile to the new political
movements afoot.
This combination of neglect and outright hostility pushed Diderot to the
margins of French culture in the nineteenth century, and it would take
another century before retrospective interest in his work would be
renewed. Too systematically committed to his materialism, too vigorous in
his irreligion, and too passionate and principled in his embrace of
egalitarianism and universal democracy to be acceptable to anyone with
the slightest worry about the rising tides of radical socialism and
materialist freethought, Diderot became a pariah for many in nineteenth-
century France and Europe. Only after 1870 was interest in his work
revived, thanks in part to the new editions of his writings, which made him
newly available to scholars and readers, and to the changing cultural and
political climate. Soviet Marxists, for example, played a key role in
reviving Diderot scholarship after 1900, and contemporary Diderot
studies, which is thriving today, is largely a twentieth-century creation.
Literary scholars led the way in establishing the contemporary scholarship,
Charles T. Wolfe and J.B. Shank
Summer 2019 Edition 17
but recently scholars attuned to the very different character of philosophy
and science in the eighteenth century have begun to return to Diderot’s
work, finding in it the complex and sophisticated thinking that was his
hallmark.
Diderot is now actively studied by both literary scholars and intellectual
historians alike, and there was even a movement afoot as recently as 2013
to enshrine Diderot alongside Rousseau, Voltaire, and Condorcet in the
Panthéon of French national heroes. Headlines worrying about “un homme
dangereux au Panthéon?” revealed the continuing influence of his alleged
infamy, yet the twenty-first century may be the moment when Diderot is
finally recognized as the important eighteenth-century philosopher that he
was.
For a more complete biography of Diderot, see the Biographical
Supplement.
2. Major Themes of Diderot’s Philosophy
There are different ways of dividing up Diderot’s intellectual career, some
which emphasize pure philosophical commitments, others focusing on
particular projects or strands of his thought, and still others giving pride of
place to politics. Of course, all of them acknowledge the central place of
the Encyclopédie, not just because it was an enormous editorial project
spanning many of the “best” years of Diderot’s productive life, but
because it marked the invention of a new model of knowledge,
collaborative in the literal sense as a compendium of individually authored
articles, but also in the sense of joining disciplines, including the “arts and
crafts,” as newly equal purveyors of theoretical knowledge along with
“first philosophy”. The Encyclopédie is also an important resource if one
is looking for Diderot’s sources, as he authored many long entries on
Epicureanism, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, or rather Leibnizianism, along
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with texts on eclecticism, skepticism and other doctrines which reveal
both his involvement with such ideas and the way he transforms them.
2.1 Skepticism, eclecticism and language
Aside from the early translation projects discussed in Part I, Diderot’s first
philosophical writings, such as the Pensées philosophiques (1746,
expanded in 1762) and the Promenade du sceptique (1747), play a
complicated rhetorical game with deism (rather than overt materialism),
skepticism, and natural religion. In the Pensées, Diderot even toys with a
“design argument” using the classic example of the complexity of a
butterfly’s wing (§ XVIII), although he seems to retract this a few years
later, in the Apologie de l’Abbé de Prades (1752), writing that “I thought
the wing of a butterfly brought me closer to divinity than a volume of
metaphysics” (DPV IV: 361, translations always ours unless otherwise
indicated). Even if he is not yet a materialist in these works, Diderot does
speak of the necessity to “widen” or “enlarge” God (Pensées
philosophiques, § XXVI), a phrase which has fairly strong Spinozist
and/or deist overtones.
By the time of the Lettre sur les aveugles (1749), Diderot has launched
upon a philosophical project, or a set of intersecting projects, which will
endure to the end of his life: a radicalization of empiricism in the direction
of a materialist metaphysics, which also remains at times skeptical or at
least anti-foundationalist with regard both to the possibility of an
intellectual system, and to the existence of order or totality in the universe.
Yet if Diderot’s philosophy needs to be understood in terms of his lifelong
project to develop and refine certain clear metaphysical and
epistemological commitments and arguments, it also needs be to
understood in terms of his avowed “eclecticism”, in particular his hostility
to overly binary dogmatic thinking. This reflects his deep awareness of the
Charles T. Wolfe and J.B. Shank
Summer 2019 Edition 19
complexities of language itself, especially the immanent tendency for
speech to refute itself and subvert its stated convictions. Diderot’s
passionate love for irony, satire, humor, and the play of language as both a
critical and subversive force often served him as a vehicle for capturing
the infinite complexities of being that transcend stable finite human
understanding, which means we his writing should also be read with the
same attention to its linguistic complexity that he had when writing it.
Although the link it is not often noted, it is useful in this context to
remember that Diderot was among the generation of French philosophers
that were directly influenced by Nicolas Malebranche, whose influence
upon French philosophy in the years 1690–1730, the precise years of
Diderot’s maturation as a thinker, was immense and insufficiently
recognized. This influence was not rooted in Malebranche’s specific
doctrines such as occasionalism, but in the model his philosophy offered
of how empirical skepticism could be sustained together with scientific,
and especially mathematical rationalism. Diderot’s own affection for
mathematics was rooted in these Malebranchian currents of French
thought, as were his strong convictions about the limits of mathematics as
well.
Malebranche’s philosophy has aptly been described as “Hume, but with
Christian faith” in the sense that like Hume he offers a massive skeptical
critique of the capacity for humans to produce certain knowledge as a
result of the epistemological inadequacy of their senses and higher
cognitive faculties, but unlike him Malebranche nevertheless offers a path
forward toward such knowledge through a Cartesian understanding of
divine reason as accessible to humans through the proper practice of
mathematical reasoning. In brief, to reason like god is to reason like an
advanced mathematician, especially one trained in the new analytical
mathematics of the period, and to the extent that this kind of reasoning is
adaptable to human language itself, it allows for human thinking to
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connect with the divine order of things through a proper practice of
rigorous cognitive and linguistic discipline. Anchoring this understanding
for Malebranche was a Christian faith in a rationally created cosmos
accessible to the human mind, and while later Malebranchians followed
Hume in discarding this Christian foundation, many nevertheless absorbed
Malebranche’s lessons regarding the power of a properly constituted
language (his model was advanced analytical mathematics) to serve as a
bridge connecting limited humans with the infinitude of being. Diderot’s
partner D’Alembert represented the explicitly mathematical strand of this
tradition of thinking, but Diderot embodied another strand, more attentive
to language in all its variety as the link joining finite human understanding
with the infinite complexities of nature. Although Diderot was suspicious
of D’Alembert’s Malebranchian conception of mathematics as the
foundational model for all of science, his own interests in the empirical
natural sciences were still rooted in the same preoccupation with how
nature represents itself and is represented by humans in scientific work. He
was especially attentive to the crucial role that language plays in rendering
experiential phenomena suitable for human knowledge, and if he was
critical of the over-emphasis upon mathematics as the supreme model for a
fully rigorous scientific language, he was nevertheless Malebranchian in
treating the relation between experiential phenomena, linguistic
description, and human knowledge in all its variety as the epistemological
zone that mattered most.
Diderot’s eclecticism from this perspective was not simply a negative
reaction against dogmatism, even if in his important Encyclopédie article
“Éclectisme”, he opposes eclecticism to sectarianism. He also explicitly
ties eclecticism to an attention to language and discursivity in philosophy.
Founders of discursivity are eclectics, distinct from syncretists (Diderot
mentions Luther and Bruno as examples). However, he fully disapproves
of the Alexandrian school of eclectics, while attaching himself to modern
eclecticism (including Campanella, Hobbes, and Bacon, but also
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Descartes, a reference that makes most sense if read through
Malebranchian Cartesianism): “The eclectic does not randomly gather
together truths, nor leave them in isolation; even less does she force them
into some determinate plan” (Enc. V: 270). Diderot presents both Bacon
and Descartes as eclectics, which we might actually think of as meaning
“empiricists”, in the sense of placing experience and experiment at the
center of knowledge-gathering practices. But we should also see this in
terms of language, remembering the link between Montaigne and his
project of representing natural experience through his new genre of the
essay, and Bacon’s own attachments to empiricism, experimentalism, and
the genre of the essay, along with other forms of representational writing,
including fictional storytelling and the use of aphorisms alongside other
more recognizable philosophical genres.
Diderot’s eclecticism and materialism nevertheless remain in tension,
since eclecticism is not conducive to foundational ontological
commitments, while materialism, whatever the specific matter theory it
bases itself on, seems to be a paramount case of a foundationalist
ontology. What is real is matter, or perhaps, what the sciences of matter
declare to be real (and this can vary widely, from the chemistry of mixts
which Diderot was so fascinated by [Pépin 2012], to the nascent biology
he seems to be calling for in the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature,
as we discuss below, to physics). And yet, as a series of propositional
pensées offered to readers without any interconnecting discursive bridge
between themes, this text also propounds eclecticism methodologically, in
contrast to a systematically presented set of premises, arguments and
conclusions. This play between imaginative possibility and demonstrative
certainty, and between what rationally must be and what language is
capable of capturing and conveying in human terms is characteristic of
Diderot’s thought overall, and his philosophy cannot be shorn of this
conceptual linguistic instability without destroying its power.
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In the next three sections, we discuss his empiricism, his materialism and
what we term his philosophical anthropology, namely, his ideas
concerning features specific to human beings, such as aesthetics and
ethics, although as we discuss, these are also located within Diderot’s
overall commitment to naturalism.
2.2 Radicalizing empiricism
2.2.1 Empiricism, from epistemology to ontology
Diderot is heavily influenced by Locke and in general by a kind of
empiricism that was “in the air”: our knowledge about the world is
derived, either fully or at least in large part, from our senses. In the Lettre
sur les aveugles and its companion piece, the Lettre sur les sourds et
muets, as well as later pieces such as the Rêve, Diderot turns the question
of the senses and how we know the external world on its head: the senses
possess or carry with them their own respective metaphysics. It is a
powerful kind of relativism. And there is a new hierarchy in which touch
is fundamental, in direct opposition to classical philosophical doctrines in
which sight received that honour: throughout his work, but especially in
these two essays devoted to the metaphysics of the senses and his various
aesthetic writings, Diderot insists on the primacy of touch, which he also
describes as “the most philosophical of senses”; he deplores the fact that
“the hands are despised for their materialism” (LSM; DPV IV: 15, 54).
This is even given atheist overtones in the Lettre sur les aveugles when the
blind mathematician Saunderson on his deathbed declares that “if you
wish me to believe in God, you will have to make me touch him” (DPV
IV: 48).
Diderot expresses his materialism in this work through the character of a
blind man, also because he is like a living counterexample to the argument
from design. Indeed, Saunderson says to his interlocutor, who is defending
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physico-theological design and order: “What did we do to God, you and I,
so that one of us possesses this organ (of sight), and the other of us is
deprived of it?” (DPV IV: 63). In a further twist, Diderot also equates the
blind man with idealist metaphysics since it is also cut off from direct
sensory engagement with the world. Here, empiricism is no longer just a
doctrine about the sources of knowledge, i.e., an epistemology. The world
of a blind man is different from that of a deaf man, and so forth. Further,
an individual who possessed a sense in addition to our five senses would
find our ethical horizon quite imperfect (DPV IV: 27).
A similar displacement of the “scope” of empiricism occurs in the
companion Lettre sur les sourds et muets, with a rather different version of
Condillac’s thought experiment of the statue:
The senses here are treated as producing “worlds” in which we live, not as
epistemological sources of knowledge, which was the strict issue raised by
Molyneux’s Problem (if a person born blind, with an understanding of
basic mathematics, recovered their sight and saw a cube, would they
instantly know what it was?), a problem that goes through considerable
reconfiguration with the character of Saunderson.
My idea would be to decompose a man, so to speak, and examine
what he derives from each of the senses he possesses. I recall how
I was once concerned with this sort of metaphysical anatomy, and
had found that of all the senses, the eye was the most superficial,
the ear the most proud, smell the most pleasurable, and taste the
deepest, most philosophical sense. It would be a pleasant society, I
think—one composed of five people, each of whom only possessed
one sense. They would undoubtedly call each other mad, and I
leave you to imagine how right they might be. Yet this is an image
for what happens to everyone: one only has one sense and one
judges on everything. (DPV IV: 140)
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2.2.2 Empiricism and experimentalism
Empiricism is further transformed by Diderot in accordance with his
project to transform knowledge by inscribing it in the sphere of practice
and “arts and crafts,” especially with the Encyclopédie. He sometimes
refers approvingly to the manual labourer (manouvrier)’s production of an
artisanal knowledge, notably in his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la
nature (§ XXX), which not coincidentally sounds Baconian and Lockean.
But more surprisingly, he also equates this transformed, even “enhanced”
vision of empiricism with a metaphysics. That is, on the one hand he is an
empiricist advocating the experimental sources of new knowledge,
sometimes presented as “experimental philosophy”:
We can also see this anti-foundationalist and experimentalist attitude as
challenging Descartes’ “chains of reasons” which extend to all our
knowledge of things; Diderot begins the above work by explaining that he
will let his thoughts follow the order in which objects presented
themselves to his reflection (§ I). Such a view is also resonant with what
we might term Malebranche’s quasi-sensationalism, which locates
scientific thinking in the reduction of our stream of sensate observations to
the rationalizing logics of mathematical analysis, if we consider that, aside
from the “occasionalism” which has dominated his Anglophone reception,
much of Malebranche’s Recherche de la verité is about how our bodily
passions and our sensations produce errors in us, which makes
Experimental philosophy does not know what its work will yield or
fail to yield; but it works without pause. On the contrary, rational
philosophy weighs the possibilities, makes pronouncements, and
stops there. It boldly declares, light cannot be decomposed;
experimental philosophy listens, and remains silent for centuries;
then suddenly shows us the prism, and declares, light is
decomposed. (IN, § XXIII; DPV IX: 43–44; his emphasis)
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Malebranche a sensationalist in recognizing that conception of the human
subject as the start for any epistemological project of knowing. Diderot,
from the Lettre sur les aveugles on, is a dedicated empiricist and
sensationalist, although he expands the remit of these philosophical
programs far beyond “epistemology”.
But on the other hand, Diderot treats the idea of experimental philosophy
rather playfully, both endorsing it and going beyond it in a more
speculative direction, as when he mockingly refers to the mathematician’s
self-confident rejection of metaphysics by writing, “the metaphysician …
is someone who knows nothing”, and comments that
avenging metaphysics, in the sense of turning the charge of being overly
speculative back at the scientists!
2.2.3 An experimental metaphysics
Sometimes the empiricist and the metaphysical tendencies are
encapsulated in a single formulation, as in the “experimental metaphysics”
in the Bijoux indiscrets, by which he means an experience-based
metaphysics, building up from the fact that “all is experimental in us” (SA;
DPV XVI: 87); this formulation does not mean that we are the result of an
endless series of trial and error attempts, but that all results from
experience.
In his Encyclopédie article “Métaphysique”, Diderot also opposes an
abstract metaphysics of time, space and being to a practice-based
metaphysics: he suggests that practitioners such as musicians and
chemists, physicians, naturalists and all of those engaged in
experimental practices (l’art expérimental) … seem to me to be on
the point of avenging metaphysics, and applying the same
definition to the mathematician (IN, § III; DPV IX: 29–30)
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geometricians be asked about the “metaphysics of their art”, which will
yield promising results, just as in the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la
nature he lauded the figure he described as the “manouvrier d’expérience”,
a kind of artisan-experimenter whose practice has yielded, over years of
experience, an artisanal knowledge.
Contrary to a now-common idea that the opposition between rationalism
and empiricism should be replaced with a more historically legitimate
opposition between experimental philosophy and speculative philosophy
(Anstey 2005), Diderot’s case suggests a blend between empiricism cum
experimentalism, and speculation. He is often confronted with the need to
continue his analysis of phenomena beyond the limits of strict empiricism:
the nature of matter, the limits of animation or on the more internal scale,
the functioning of the nervous system or the mechanics of generation. And
here the need for metaphysical imagination comes into play, which is not
the same as a strictly abstract metaphysics. Once again, Diderot’s
criticisms of mathematical abstraction in favor of the greater concreteness
of the life sciences, which he shares with Buffon, can be adduced here.
2.3 Materialism, science and living matter
Diderot was not a physician like La Mettrie, or a “working natural
historian” like Buffon, although at one point he wrote that, “It is very hard
to do metaphysics or ethics well, without being an anatomist, a naturalist,
a physiologist, and a physician” (RH; DPV XXIV: 555). Nevertheless, one
of his first publications was the translation of James’ Medicinal Dictionary
(1745), and in addition to his enormous activity as the chief editor of the
Encyclopédie, which heavily features medical entries, sometimes with his
editorial interventions, he was also a serious student of chemistry,
including “vital chemistry” (Pépin 2012). Later in life he declared that
“there were no books I read more willingly than medical books” (EP;
DPV XVII: 510).
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Given this background, Diderot’s interactions with the life sciences of his
time can be understood, obviously, as the activity of an educated
individual with a strong interest in the implications for philosophy of new
scientific discoveries and conceptual schemas, whether from medicine,
biology, or natural history. But his articulation of all of these in a
materialist project does not belong to or open onto an episode amongst
others in the history of science. That is, his articulation of a unique kind of
philosophical materialism is indeed in “dialogue with” or “influenced by”
the sciences of his time, particularly the life sciences (which included
chemistry for Diderot), but it is also a speculative project; materialism in
Diderot’s time, like in ours, was not a monolithic concept (Springborg and
Wunderlich [eds] 2016).
2.3.1 Vital materialism as “modern Spinozism”
Diderot opposed the novelty and conceptual significance of the life
sciences to what he (incorrectly) judged to be the historical stagnation of
mathematics:
Similarly, in a letter to Voltaire five years later (February 19 1758), he
wrote clearly that “The reign of mathematics has ended. Tastes have
changed, in favor of natural history and letters”. Diderot is opposing the
new “taste” and interest for a set of preoccupations including two forms of
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the
taste people seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of
nature and experimental physics, I dare say that before a hundred
years, there will not be more than three great geometricians
remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the
Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairauts, the Fontaines
and the D’Alemberts will have left it…. We will not go beyond.
(IN, § IV; DPV IX: 30–31)
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“life science” (natural history and “experimental physics”) to the
traditional prestige of mathematical science. In these passages, he is also
squarely locating his materialist preoccupations within the former.
Diderot’s natural philosophy is deeply and centrally “biologistic”. As it
emerges in the mid-eighteenth century, at a time before the appearance of
the term “biology” as a way of designating a unified science of life, his
project is motivated by the desire both to understand the laws governing
organic beings and to emphasize, more philosophically, the uniqueness of
organic beings within the physical world as a whole. Consider a little-
known aspect of Diderot’s articulation of his project: his statement in
favour of biological epigenesis within his short entry “Spinosiste” in the
Encyclopédie. The entry does not bear his name, but large parts of the
content occur elsewhere in his writings, and it is included in all editions of
his works. Here he grafts new biological ideas such as epigenesis onto a
Spinozist substance metaphysics (Wolfe 2014a), distinguishing between
“ancient” and “modern” Spinozists and emphasizing that the latter
specifically hold that “matter is sensitive”, as demonstrated “by the
development of the egg, an inert body which by means of heat alone
moves to the state of a sensing, living being”. For modern Spinozists,
“only matter exists, and that it is sufficient to explain everything. For the
rest, they follow ancient Spinozism in all of its consequences” (Enc. XV:
474).
Diderot is rather unexpectedly combining Spinoza’s metaphysics of
substance with a new theory of biological development, epigenesis,
according to which the embryo grows by the successive addition of layers
of purely material substance. Why call the latter view “modern
Spinozism”? The “ancient Spinozists” are substance monists and
metaphysicians, while their modern descendants are also committed to
biological epigenesis, and assert that matter is fundamentally living matter.
Is this Spinozism or not? What possible relation could there be between
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Spinozism and epigenesis? Or how can a metaphysics of substance and
modes, which says almost nothing about biological entities even if it is
also a major statement of philosophical naturalism, also be a fashionable
embryological theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? In fact,
very few commentators have asked why Diderot gives such an
idiosyncratic definition of “modern Spinozism”.
To be sure, his convictions regarding living matter (or all of matter
inasmuch as it is potentially living and sensing) are tied to his admiration
for the metaphysics of a single substance composed of an infinite number
of modes. As he states in the Rêve de D’Alembert, “There is only one
substance in the universe” (DPV XVII, 107; Wartofsky 1952/1979,
Deprun 1986, Bourdin 2008). But nowhere does Spinoza seek to connect
his metaphysics to the life sciences; even if the notion of the conatus was
frequently taken up in the generations after him to mean something like a
survival impulse in living beings, this was not what he meant at all.
Diderot is grafting “vitalist” elements onto a substance metaphysics, or at
least, he is connecting an apparently empirical account of the self-
organisation of matter with a new metaphysics. Epigenesis is not just one
biological theory among others here, but rather, part of a revised
metaphysics of matter, which Diderot presents in more overtly ideological
terms in the Rêve:
Do you see this egg? With this you can overthrow all the schools
of theology, all the churches of the world. What is this egg? An
unsensing mass, prior to the introduction of the seed [germe]; and
after the seed has been introduced, what is it then? Still an
unsensing mass, for the seed itself is merely an inert, crude fluid.
How will this mass develop into a different [level of] organisation,
to sensitivity and life? By means of heat. And what will produce
the heat? Motion. (DPV XVII, 103–104)
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Matter for Diderot is self-organizing and endowed with vital properties.
This implies that his brand of materialism is not synonymous with
physicalism (admittedly, not a term or notion of the period). There were of
course materialists such as Hobbes who can also be described as
physicalists, but Diderot was quite explicitly a determinist, as we will
discuss below (in section 2.4). This leads to two rather original
consequences, which we examine in the following sections: Diderot’s
metaphysics of vital matter is not strictly experimentally based, it is also
speculative; and his is a specifically embodied materialism.
2.3.2 Matter theory and living matter
In the very first paragraph of Le Rêve de D’Alembert, the character
D’Alembert, who is a partisan of substance dualism and is challenging the
character Diderot—a materialist—to account for the existence of
consciousness and thought, introduces the problem of sensibility
(sensibilité, better translated “sensitivity”) as a property. Referring to a
discussion that seems to have occurred before the text begins, he declares
to Diderot, “this sensitivity … if it is a general and essential quality of
matter, then stones must sense” (DPV XVII, 90). Diderot states, revises,
emends and restates this materialism of living, sensing matter in a variety
of works, both in the Rêve and in his more “empirically” oriented writings
such as the Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement and
the Eléments de physiologie.
Later, building on an explicitly chemical matter theory, Diderot will
describe nature as perpetually “in action and reaction; everything being
destroyed in one form and recomposed in another; sublimations,
dissolutions and combinations of all kinds”, in the “general movement or
rather fermentation of the universe” (PPMM; DPV XVII: 17–18). This
short piece of “philosophy of physics” includes a polemic aimed at all
those who define matter as inert and homogeneous (latter-day Cartesians).
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Diderot wants to establish in contrast that motion is inherent in matter by
joining together translation and nisus. Indeed, matter possesses properties
including sensitivity.
The key property of living matter, and of all matter potentially, is organic
sensitivity. Diderot often suggests that “sensitivity or touch is common to
all beings”, and he often attributes sensitivity to matter as a whole (EP;
DPV XVII: 308). In “Leibnizianisme”, he brings together Aristotle’s
entelechy, Leibniz’s monads, and sensitivity as a “general property of
matter” (Enc. IX: 371); indeed, Leibnizian metaphysics and theories of
generation had a great impact on eighteenth-century thought, and has been
viewed as major influences in the formulation of Diderot’s materialism,
albeit in naturalized form, e.g: “the monad, the real atom of nature, the
true element of things” (Enc. IX: 374a). Elsewhere, such as the 1765
Letter to Duclos, Diderot denies that sensitivity can be a property of a
molecule, specifically because it can only be a property of matter itself. He
then complicates the issue further by introducing a distinction between
“inert” sensitivity and “active” sensitivity.
Nevertheless, Diderot’s matter theory is very much one of a living,
sensing, self-transforming matter, sometimes specified in chemical terms:
The critique of mathematical abstraction in favor of a more empirically
rich matter theory, whether this is presented as deriving from natural
You can practice geometry and metaphysics as much as you like;
but I, who am a physicist and a chemist, who take bodies in nature
and not in my mind, I see them as existing, various, bearing
properties and actions, as agitated in the universe as they are in the
laboratory where if a spark is in the proximity of three combined
molecules of saltpeter, carbon and sulfur, a necessary explosion
will ensue. (PPMM; DPV XVII: 34)
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history, chemistry, medicine, physiology or other disciplines, is also a
constant in Diderot. The point we would emphasize most, however, is that
this is also a speculative metaphysics. The shift from inert to active
sensitivity is not experimentally grounded. That Diderot’s materialism was
not strictly an outgrowth of empiricism, and/or experimentally based, as
one might expect given the usually close relation between scientific
practice and materialist philosophy, is also apparent in the dimensions he
sometimes is willing to allow to his cosmogony of universally living
matter.
On one occasion, he wrote to Sophie Volland describing how such ideas
led him to be teased, but he pushes them even further in the letter, in the
direction of a materialist account of love. The result is not so much a
reductionist explanation of the phenomenon of love as a romanticization
of materialism itself:
The rest of the evening was spent teasing me about my paradox.
People gave me beautiful pears that were alive, grapes that could
think. And I said: Those who loved each other during their lives
and arrange to be buried next to one another are maybe not as mad
as one thinks. Their ashes may be pressed together, mingling,
uniting. What do I know? Maybe they have not lost all feeling, all
memory of their prior state. Maybe they have a remainder of heat
and life, which they enjoy in their own fashion, at the bottom of
the cold urn in which they rest. We judge the life of elements by
the life of crude aggregates. Maybe they are entirely different
entities…. When the polyp is divided into a hundred thousand
parts, the primitive, generational animal is no longer, but all of its
principles are still alive. O my Sophie, I then still have a hope of
touching, sensing, loving, seeking you, uniting and melding with
you, when we are no longer. If there were a law of affinity amidst
our principles, if we were entitled to compose a common being; if,
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This image of a kind of eternity in which “loving molecules” gradually
return to one another, impelled by a residual consciousness of the love
present in their “parent bodies”, resonates with the powerful rendition he
gives in the first dialogue of the Rêve of the thought experiment of the
statue. Recall that the character D’Alembert had challenged the character
Diderot to show that matter could think, and the latter had retorted that if
he could show that matter could sense the solution would be found. The
character Diderot then proposed a thought experiment of a marble statue,
ground into powder, mixed into the earth, out of which plants grow that
are eaten by animals who are in turn eaten by us. He calls this process the
“animalization” of matter. Thus framed, the difference between a piece of
marble and a sensing, conscious creature is only a difference in the
temporal stages of a portion of matter in transformation. Unlike
Condillac’s statue, Diderot’s is no longer a strictly epistemological account
of the genesis of our knowledge (and self-consciousness) through the
accumulation of intermodal sensory information. Instead, it is an assertion
of the animalization of inert matter, such that all matter is either actually
or potentially alive.
2.3.3 Body and embodiment
But what of actual bodies in this universe of living matter? Diderot’s
notion of body is quite different from, say, that of Descartes and Hobbes.
“As a physicist”, Diderot writes, “one should never say the body qua body,
because this is no longer physics, it is making abstractions which lead to
nothing” (PPMM; DPV XVII: 16). As he wrote to Sophie Volland, “Have
in following centuries, I were to comprise a whole again with you;
if the molecules of your dissolved lover were to stir, to move
about, and search out yours, scattered throughout nature! Grant me
this chimaera. It is sweet to me. It would ensure my eternity in you
and with you …. (letter of 15 October 1759, translation C. Wolfe)
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you ever thought seriously about what it is to live? … Life is not just
motion, it is something else” (letter of 15 October 1759). Indeed, he may
quite fairly be described as a theorist of embodiment.
His materialist notion of embodiment means that Diderot does not oppose
the living body as a kind of subjectivity to the world of matter overall. As
is particularly apparent with Saunderson in the Lettre sur les aveugles and
the account of the nervous system in the Rêve de D’Alembert, Diderot
“pit[s] the unity of sensibility against a Cartesian unity of subjectivity”
(Gaukroger 2010: 416). However, this emphasis on embodiment is neither
a “top-down,” emergent view of life (even if “life is not just motion”), nor
an antireductionist position (contrast Kaitaro 1997). For Diderot, emphasis
on the features of the living body and a deflationary and/or reductionist
attitude go hand in hand. “The action of the soul on the body is the action
of one part of the body on another”, he writes, “and the action of the body
on the soul is again that of one part of the body on another” (EP; DPV
XVII: 334–335). This was certainly reductionist in the eyes of defenders
of an immortal and/or immaterial soul, but it is not per se eliminativist
inasmuch as Diderot is saying that “mental processes” (if we take the
language of “soul” here to be psychological language) are bodily
processes, not that they are illusory or otherwise unreal. Similarly,
commenting on the Dutch scientist Franz Hemsterhuis’ manuscript, he
notes: “wherever I read soul I replace it with man or animal” (DPV XXIV:
340). This is a venerable trait of materialisms going back at least as far as
Lucretius, and Diderot does not necessarily deploy this tradition to deny
the existence of the soul, but rather to challenge the “animist” or the
“idealist” claim “to explain anything without the body” (EP; DPV XVII:
334). Even more interestingly, this shift can also be seen in broader terms
as a shift within reductionist strategies, which we can also classify as types
of reduction.
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One strategy for the early modern materialist was to deny the existence of
a “higher-level” entity such as the soul (or free will, or thinking, etc.) in
favor of a hypothetical “basic physics” or the properties of matter in
general. Thus La Mettrie wrote, in his 1748 L’Homme-Machine, that
In contrast, another strategy is to construe “soul” in functional terms, as
not conflicting in any way with a basic materialist ontology, if it is not a
substance of its own. Thus the materialist could be less overtly
confrontational towards the concept of soul. For instance, because it has
been naturalised, the soul can be treated, as La Mettrie suggests, as “but a
principle of motion or a material and sensible part of the brain” (La
Mettrie 1987, vol. I: 105). Here, as in Diderot, the status of the soul is
displaced away from metaphysics towards the particular physiological site
of the brain. Diderot’s Eléments de physiologie, as well as his
supplementary remarks in the article “Âme”, stress both the complexity of
the brain for any reductionist materialist project, and the “displacement”
of the soul therein. The concept of the body which is at work in these
materialist texts is, if not “ensouled”, certainly animated and vitalised, as
in this remark of Diderot’s:
The soul is just a pointless term of which we have no idea and
which a good mind should only use to refer to that part of us which
thinks. Given the slightest principle of movement, animate bodies
will have everything they need to move, feel, think, repent and in a
word, behave in the physical realm as well as the moral realm
which depends on it. (La Mettrie 1987, vol. I: 98)
Whatever idea we initially have of [the soul], it is necessarily a
mobile, extended, sensitive and composite entity. It grows tired just
like the body, it rests like the body, it loses its control over the
body just as the body loses its control over the soul…. Is the soul
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He also presents the brain as the source of our identity, or of what it is for
me to be me, although he sometimes thinks it is the whole organism which
composes our individuality. He recognizes the brain as a very particular
kind of organ, one in need of special attention, and, rather unusually for
the period, he seems to call attention to its plasticity in a discussion of
memory:
Diderot had been discussing several extremely lyrical cases of recalling
landscapes both in nature and in painting, and then almost abruptly turns
to cerebral-material explanations of such phenomena. What is unusual
about this in the history of philosophical and early neurophysiological
discussions of the brain is Diderot’s striking image of the brain as a book
which reads itself, and the embodied brain-reader as self-organizing
(Wolfe 2016b).
Even if Diderot’s conception of body and brain indicate that he is not
treating them in terms of basic physics alone, he holds the existence of
causal relations to be fundamental; as he writes, “‘Every cause is an effect’
seems axiomatic to me” (DPV XXIV: 309). Without this foundationally
construed sense of causality, Nature would constantly be taking leaps,
gay, sad, angry, tender, shy, lustful? It is nothing without the body.
(EP; DPV XVII: 334)
The soft substance of the brain [is] a mass of sensitive and living
wax, which can take on all sorts of shapes, losing none of those it
received, and ceaselessly receiving new ones which it retains.
There is the book. But where is the reader? The reader is the book
itself. For it is a sensing, living, speaking book, which
communicates by means of sounds and gestures the order of its
sensations. (DPV XVII: 470)
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which he thinks is a mistaken vision of things. In other words, he is
committed to a form of determinism.
2.4 Determinism and change
All forms of materialism are deterministic, but in different ways. Nothing
compels the materialist to accept that the body and the passions are
deterministic just like a simple machine. Unsurprisingly, a lot depends on
how causes are understood, and how much weight they are meant to bear
in both an ontology and an account of action (see entry on causal
determinism). Thus it is quite possible to hold, like Helvétius, d’Holbach
or Hobbes, that there is a fixed, stable and predictable relation between our
sensory input, our mental life and consequently our “temper” and our
actions. “As a being that is organized so as to think and to feel”,
D’Holbach explained, “you must feel pleasure or pain; you must love or
hate in accordance with the way your organs are affected by the causes
surrounding you or within you” (D’Holbach 1770/1781: I.i [1990: 18]).
But the organismic elements in Diderot’s materialism and vision of the
body lead him to challenge Helvétius’ program of reform, which asserts,
on the basis of an empiricist and specifically sensationalist epistemology,
that human beings really are fully modifiable “blank slates”, modifiable in
terms of what we call stimuli and responses. Interestingly, it is by denying
this “full modifiability” that Diderot can defend a certain notion of
individuality. The fact that individuals differ from each other at the level
of their organisation grants them a degree of self-determination. “Every
day, I see men who prefer to die rather than to correct themselves” (DPV
XVIII: 344). That is, what Diderot calls “modifiability”, which might
better be termed “corrigibility”, has limits, and these limits do not just
reflect some kind of blunt innatism (whether of genetic heritage or of
character), but rather a degree of individuality, including at the level of
agency. Biologically, Diderot often stressed the enormous variation of
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traits such as intelligence from one individual to another, noting that the
difference between an “idiot” and a “genius” hinges on tiny shifts in
“brain fibers”. There is more difference, he insists, between one individual
and another in terms of intelligence than between a human being and an
animal (DPV XXIV: 299). But there is no sharp divide between the
biological and the personal, for Diderot.
Helvétius had described to Diderot how severely he was punished for De
l’Esprit, with the consequence that he would “rather die than write another
line again”. Diderot responds with a long tale about two cats he saw from
his window, who fell from a roof. One died from the fall, but the other got
up, bruised and bloodied, and said to himself,
However, as soon as the cat feels better, he climbs back up on the roof
again (RH; DPV XXIV: 542–543). Just like the cat is determined by his
own constitution and drives, similarly, Helvétius has no choice but to go
on writing.
Diderot’s determinism is also his way of extending core empiricist tenets
such as nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu (there is nothing in
the mind that was not first in our sense), which acquires a determinist
dimension: “there is only one operation in man, sensing. This operation is
… never free” (OH; DPV XXIV: 300; cf. PC; DPV XX: 85) and
I would rather die than ever climb on the roof again. What am I
looking for up there? A mouse that is not worth the tasty morsel I
could get from my mistress, or steal from the cook …
perception comes from sensation; from perception, we get
reflection, meditation and judgment. There is nothing free in
intellectual operations, or in sensation. (EP; DPV XVII: 335)
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There is also a tension in Diderot’s approach to determinism between his
acceptance of physicalism (“there is only one kind of cause … physical
causes”: to Landois, DPV IX: 258) and causal closure (“the physical world
and the moral world are one and the same”: PC; DPV XX: 53), and his
insistence that agency, which for him covers the action of complex
organisms overall and is not restricted to humans or even higher
mammals, requires another, specific kind of causality: “I am a man, and I
require causes proper to man” (RH; DPV XXIV: 523). Diderot is not
defending free will or an unchallenged space of agency, yet there is a kind
of residual anthropocentrism in some of his arguments, presented in the
language of unified causality. As he explains:
Diderot is neither asserting total interconnection (as in Laplacian
determinism) nor defending the existence of freedom to act as
“indifference” or “agent causation”, but an intermediate view (once known
as the Hume-Mill thesis) according to which what it is to be “me” is to be
a particular causal nexus.In that sense, I cannot “do otherwise than
myself” or “be anyone other than myself” (JLF; DPV XXIII: 190, 28; on
Diderot on individuality and selfhood, see Thiel 2015, Wolfe 2015).
However, in good Lucretian fashion, this unified causal loop we call
“ourself” or “myself” is itself subject to what Diderot terms “vicissitude”,
a term that connotes change and flux in this context.
Without regard for the sum of elements of which I am composed, I
am one, and a cause only has one effect. I have always been one
single cause [une cause une], thus I have never had more than one
effect to produce; my duration is thus nothing more than a
succession of necessary effects.
In one and the same man, everything is in perpetual vicissitude…
It is only by means of memory that we are the same individual to
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Diderot wrote that
thus
The instability in this continual movement between seemingly free and
willful individuality and collective, biological/metaphysical determinism
also sits at the heart of the perpetual dialectic between “Moi”and “Lui” in
Le Neveu de Rameau.
Further, this emphasis on mutability, change and “vicissitudes” including
at a specifically biological level can sound evolutionary to a post-
Darwinian reader, and for Diderot, “to be born, to live, to die is merely to
change forms” (RA; DPV XVII: 139), in the “ever-changing” “overall
order of nature”: “Everything is in in fluxu et eterno et perpetuo et
necessario” (OH; DPV XXIV: 317). He also explicitly uses the Lucretian
phrase Rerum novus nascitur ordo. Should these passages be understood
others and to ourselves. At my age, there may not be a single
molecule in my body that I brought into the world at my birth;
(DPD; DPV X: 423)
everything changes, everything passes … only the Whole remains.
(RA; DPV XVII: 128)
fruits, vegetables and animals are in perpetual vicissitude as
regards their qualities, forms and constituents; an ancient from four
thousand years ago or better, our nephews in ten thousand years
will most likely recognize none of the fruits we have today;
we must be extremely careful in our judgments of the ancient
historians and naturalists regarding the forms, virtues and other
qualities of beings which are in perpetual alteration. (“Acmella”,
Enc. I: 460a)
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as anticipations of evolutionary science? In fact, contrary to a widespread
tendency in older scholarship, it is mistaken to consider Diderot as either a
predecessor or a speculative exponent of evolutionary doctrines. That he
was an earnest disciple of Lucretius, fascinated with monsters and with the
transience and mutability of the physical (particularly the living) universe
overall, does not make him a “forerunner of Darwin”.
On the biological side, his fascination with monsters also feeds into his
philosophy of nature overall. “On the entire surface of the earth”, he
writes,
This explains why, as he had written earlier,
2.5 Diderot’s philosophical anthropology
2.5.1 Aesthetics
Diderot was a thoroughgoing naturalist and empirical scientist, but this did
not mean that he neglected the aesthetic dimension of human knowing, or
the artifice of representation itself that makes possible language,
communication, and human knowledge. In his Encyclopédie entry on
cabinets of natural history and their philosophical implications (“Cabinets
there is not a single man who is normally constituted or perfectly
healthy. The human species is just a mass of more or less
counterfeit, more or less sick individuals … What I say of man
applies just as well to animals, plants or minerals. (EP; DPV XVII:
515)
the dissection of a monster … is more useful to the historian of
nature [i.e., the experimental life scientist or biologist in modern
parlance] than the study of one hundred individuals who resemble
each other. (“Encyclopédie”; DPV VII: 242)
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d’histoire naturelle”), he reflects explicitly on the challenge for our finite
intellects to seek to know infinite Nature as a whole, and recommends the
construction of artificial environments such as these cabinets in order to
study “parts of Nature”. At times, his vision of aesthetics is simply a kind
of extension of his naturalism into other domains, arguing like Spinoza
that our subjective notions of beauty and ugliness have no place in nature
properly understood (in the article “Laideur”; also Salon de 1763; DPV
XIII: 373–374), and argues for a naturalist poetics (“Encyclopédie”; DPV
VII: 234). Yet he also held that aesthetics should not be reduced to crudely
naturalistic concepts, reflecting at length on the subjective issues of
aesthetic perception and judgment and the role of performance, including
that found in visual art, literature, theater, and scientific experiments, in
the production of perceived truths.
With respect to the ostensibly subjective side of human knowing, he
invested considerable energy in articulating a concept of “perception of
relations” (perception des rapports) which functions both as a theory of
judgment (explaining why it is that we find certain kinds of symmetry and
proportion pleasing) and a theory of cognitive functioning at a more basic
level, one characterized by psychoneural relations, as it were. Countering
that subjective emphasis, however, Diderot also warned against the
“surfeit” of organic sensitivity as a source of hyper-reactivity, and of
sensory stimulus as a ground for perception without any internal unifying
principle. These reflections are also found in the character Bordeu in the
Rêve who serves to ground the perceptions and queries from Mlle de
Lespinasse regarding the ravings of the dreaming D’Alembert in a clear
objective ground. Diderot describes the overly sensitive actor in the
Paradoxe sur le comédien as suffering from a “weakness in their
constitution”, and speaks ironically about the welter of emotions (“des
sensibilités diverses”) on stage being incapable of forming a unified
whole.
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2.5.2 Philosophy of language and representation
Unifying these two aspects was the eclectic Malebranchian emphasis upon
language as the bridge between the finite and the infinite, the material and
immaterial, the human knower and nature as a whole. In his aesthetics,
Diderot is continually preoccupied with the power of art to capture and
represent natural experience and its limitation in the face of the infinitude,
and often unrepresentable complexity, of life. In meta-works of what
might be called his philosophy of theater such as Discours de la poésie
dramatique and Paradoxe sur le comédien, and in his dialogue where he
conversed out loud with his readers about the theatrical logic underlying
his play Le Fils naturel, Diderot also pursued such themes by subjecting
the “reality effect” of theatrical art to a systematic interrogation so as to
unearth the rational structures of theater as a representative art form.
Diderot reflected famously and influentially on what he called the “fourth
wall of the theatre”, that imaginary barrier that separates an audience from
the three dimensions of the stage it faces. This is a barrier that for Diderot
acts either as conscious division dividing the actors and the drama from its
viewer (theatre as a consciously artificial way of representing and
knowing) or as an invisible screen through which the two join together
into the joint experience of the theatrical moment (theater as a staged
naturalism). While still important in theatre theory today—Richard
Sennett interprets Diderot as “the first great theorist of acting as a secular
activity” and as the innovator who creates a theory of drama “divorced
from ritual”—Diderot’s writings on theatre also offer yet another example
of his wider metaphysical and physiological understanding of human
beings and their embodied interrelation. They also highlight the role of
language throughout his philosophy as a tangible yet permeable and
sometimes fragile tether joining humans and their knowing together.
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In a manner similar to his “philosophy of theatre”, Diderot’s art criticism
is also very often a study of the continually recurring interplay between
sensible human subjectivity and the natural world through the perceived
empirical reality of natural representation. What happens when a viewer
stands in front of a painting and experiences its imagery? In particular,
what is the relationship between the reality of the viewer in the Louvre in
the salon gallery in front of the paintings on display and the reality of the
world represented by the image? What is it that happens exactly as we
move between these two worlds and realities? And given the presence of
both a painting and its artist at the center of this exchange, what is the role
played by the painter, his material medium, his craft in manipulating
matter into representations, and the viewing subject who both receives this
artistic work in her own senses and then recreates it in her imagination in
the making of a “natural experience”?
To combine all these dimensions into a coherent concept of art, as Diderot
did in his art criticism, was to produce a general aesthetics exploring the
capacity for human representations to render experience truthful and
meaningful. Here, Diderot also explored the power and limitations of such
practices as a form of human experience. In this way, the problem of
viewing art and speaking about the experience of viewing art, or the
question of judging artists that stage this experience, is akin to the problem
of viewing and speaking about nature itself, and of judging the nature of
the presentations put before us. Diderot’s “promenade Vernet” in the Salon
de 1767 is something of a locus classicus for these investigations with its
extended reflection on the presence of the viewer in front of a Vernet
landscape painting and the being of that viewer in the natural world that
the painting represents as well. His work in natural philosophy and the life
sciences often manifests a similar subject-object preoccupation as well,
and in this respect Diderot’s aesthetics and his natural philosophy have
much in common.
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The same combination is present in Diderot’s literary fiction as well in his
continual, and often critical, exploration of the empirical reality of
linguistic representation, and our capacities and limitations for
experiencing and knowing the world through such representations.
Jacques le fataliste, for example, is a kind of anti-novel that thwarts the
arrival of naturalized realism and credible illusion at every turn even as it
narrates a bawdy and frolicking story. Characters break with the scenes
and dialogue of the story to talk directly to the reader, and the narrator
himself is a self-conscious character in the work who often finds himself
in a struggle with the fictions he is supposedly controlling and
representing for his readers.
Le Rêve de D’Alembert is also concerned with the relation between author,
textual characters, and the naturalistic and rational representation of
thought in language and text, as is Le Neveu de Rameau, but while these
dialogues organize the play between their various registers in a way that
produces constructive philosophical investigation, Jacques le fataliste
operates deconstructively, subverting the basic coherence of the novel as a
form by repeating paragraphs verbatim on multiple pages and by
intentionally distorting the book’s narrative coherence and flow. One entire
page of the book is printed in complete black, for example, to call
attention to the print characters that make all reading and linguistic
communication possible. Diderot’s story Ceci n’est pas un conte also
operates in this subversive and deconstructive way by prefiguring
Magritte’s famous conundrum regarding the image of a pipe through a
self-destructive recursion of a story that uses storytelling to deny the
possibility of storytelling even as it narrates a story.
2.5.3 Ethics
One striking feature of Diderot’s moral thought is his self-described failure
to write a work of moral philosophy. While Diderot wanted to write such a
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work in order to refute La Mettrian immoralism, especially its particularly
bracing form of hedonism coupled with its cynical social theory, he
ultimately did not succeed in this ambition. He interestingly described his
failure, or rather reluctance, to write a work of ethics as stemming from
his recognition that,
Diderot had no desire to use his writings to ensure “the immortality of the
evildoer” (ibid.; ERCN II, 6; DPV XXV: 246–247), and at the same time
he also considered normative moral philosophy to be a failure, a view he
shared with such virtuous individuals as Locke. (In response to his friend
Lady Peterborough’s request for advice on how to morally educate her
son, Lord Morduant, Locke recommended, in a 1697 letter, that he should
read Livy (for history), along with geography and the study of morality.
But, he explained, “I mean not the ethics of the schools”, but rather Tully
(i.e., Cicero), Pufendorf, Aristotle and “above all the New Testament”,
wherein “a man may learn how to live which is the business of ethics, and
not how to define and distinguish and dispute about the names of virtue
and vice” (King 1829: 5–6). This is not a ringing endorsement of
academic moral philosophy, and Locke reiterates this view in his Thoughts
Concerning Education, § 185 and the Reasonableness of Christianity, §§
241–242.)
Another crucial feature of Diderot’s ethics was his dislike for relativism or
at least for some of its possible consequences. Diderot learned a great deal
from Locke, Montaigne and other paragons of early Western cultural
relativism. Montaigne and Locke paid close attention to the case of
cannibals; Locke, when he takes up the case of cannibals in the Essay,
uses it to support anti-innatist views with respect to what he calls
if I do not emerge victorious from this attempt, I shall become the
apologist of wickedness, I will have betrayed the cause of virtue,
and encouraged man towards vice. (RH: DPV XXIV: 589)
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“practical principles” (that is, moral principles of conduct): he points out
that the Tupinamba tribe in the Amazon considers that a high form of
virtue is eating one’s enemies, along with many other examples of
“enormities practised without remorse”, in order to stress that “moral
rules” are not innate but culturally specific and learned (Locke 1690
[1975: I.iii.9]). The challenge is not to morals per se but to “mores” and
customs which we take to encapsulate morality. Diderot echoes these ideas
notably in his Supplément au voyage de Bougainville, but contrary to
widespread views, he did not think that such relativism had to entail
libertinage, criticizing Hemsterhuis for reasoning “as if libertinage was a
necessary consequence of materialism, which seems to me to match
neither reason nor experience” (OH; DPV XXIV: 251). Unlike La Mettrie
(and the Marquis de Sade after him), Diderot maintained a strongly social
concept of self. “He who has studied himself”, he wrote, “will have
advanced in the knowledge of others, given, I think, that there is no virtue
which is foreign to the wicked, nor vice foreign to the good” (ERCN; DPV
XXV: 226).While he did not develop a full-fledged theory of sympathy
like Hume or Smith, Diderot was nevertheless acutely conscious of the
role of the passions in cementing the social bond, and how this role should
be promoted in any viable ethical theory.
Nevertheless, his hostility to immoralist versions of materialism did not
mean that he reneged on his overall naturalism, since his account of our
behavior, and of good and evil, also seeks to tie it to our physiological
constitution (our organisation, in his terms).
Ethics is confined to the borders of a species … What is a species?
A mass of individuals sharing a similar constitution. What, is this
constitution the basis of ethics?… I believe so. (SA; DPV XVI:
206)
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It is perhaps too naturalistic an ethics for some since “there is no rational
goodness or wickedness, although there may be animal goodness or
wickedness” (“Droit naturel”, Enc. V: 155b). By this Diderot means that
we do not act in accordance with purely transcendent or immaterial
principles in mind, but that we are determined by motives, affects, desires,
instincts and so on. Yet at the same time, as we also saw regarding
determinism, Diderot is concerned not only with the universe in its
entirety but with specifically human chains of causal influence as well.
“What is a human being?” he asks. “An animal? Undoubtedly, but dogs
are animals too; so are wolves. Yet humans are neither wolves nor dogs”
(SA; DPV XVI: 205).
Diderot explicitly eschews the natural ties that many see tying a
materialist conception of human being directly and naturally with
libertinism, hedonism, and a purely self-interested and solipsistic
conception of morality. This stance was reinforced in other ways by his
counter-conception of natural morality, an ethics which he often celebrated
in his writings about aesthetic representation and its value. At the center of
the naturalism that Diderot claimed for this ethics was an implicit set of
claims about experience, feeling, and action in human life. The natural
principles of sensibility spoke directly to humans about the division
between virtue and vice, or so Diderot believed, and while the virtuous
individual was the one who submitted to the natural passions inherent in
us pushing us toward camaraderie and filial love, the vicious soul was a
willful and arrogant rebel who chases selfish desire and self-gratification
against the grain of what is naturally good and true.
This metaphysical and physiological understanding of morality was
central to Diderot’s politics as well, and with respect to theater it led him
to theorize the mechanisms by which human performance and theatrical
display both supported and corrupted the pursuit of virtue. Rousseau, with
similar ethical orientations, condemned theater outright as a false and
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corrupting medium, arguing that natural religion and virtue could only be
practiced in a natural, i.e., non-artificial or non-theatrical way. Diderot’s
view was much more complicated. While he recognized the corrupting
power of artistic representation to deceive, he also recognized its power to
provoke and sustain natural experiences that promoted moral virtue. His
impassioned speeches written for imagined Africans oppressed by
European slavery, which he included in his contributions to Raynal’s
Histoire des deux Indes, illustrate well the fusion of theater and politics
characteristic of Diderot. In these moments, Diderot used the full power of
theatrical language and artificial representation to present an unequivocal
statement about moral and political righteousness, one designed to move
people to progressive and virtuous political action. Rousseau’s prize essay
discourses produced in the 1750s were also influential upon Diderot in
shaping his views, for like Rousseau Diderot developed an ideal of
natural, egalitarian, communitarian virtue, which he found most fully
developed in simple, rustic people who lived modestly and in close
relation to their natural surroundings. Diderot also developed a
countervailing conception of vice that was directly connected to wealth,
especially wealth attached to elite privilege, and a morality that
encouraged people to embrace basic organic foundations for life and to
turn away from urban lives of selfishness and hedonism. The same
morality infused his political economic writings as well, both in his
celebration of the communitarian power of commerce to unite people into
virtuous and prosperous polities, and in his critique of greed and
commercial excess as a cause for social violence and political injustice.
2.5.4 “Man and world”
At the level of aesthetics, ethics or ontology itself, Diderot is a materialist
concerned with utility, praxis, transformation and yes, agency (up to a
point). Some commentators in earlier generations thought this spelled
contradiction and the lack of any cogent philosophical position. More
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recently, it has been recognized that Diderot was precisely reflecting on
this tension between the cosmos and time-scales stretching millions of
years, and his love for Sophie Volland, or his desire to see goodness
rewarded and wickedness punished. Indeed, he sometimes offers at least
partial solutions to this old aporia. If it is true, on the one hand, that
so that there is no place for the human observer in this desolate landscape,
it is also true, on the other hand, that the only thing that makes the
existence of the spectacle of Nature interesting is the human presence
itself:
Instead of losing himself in reveries about the poetics of ruins and our
transitory existence on the face of the earth, however, Diderot instantly
asserts the pragmatic, “constructivist” and artificialist conclusion: since “It
is the presence of man that makes the existence of beings interesting”,
The universe only presents to us particular beings, infinite in
number, with hardly any fixed or determinate division. None can
be termed the first or the last; everything is linked therein, and
follows what came before by imperceptible nuances. In this
immense uniformity of objects, if some appear which, like the tips
of rocks, seem to pierce through the surface and dominate it, they
only owe this prerogative to particular systems, vague conventions,
and foreign events, not to the physical arrangement of beings and
the intention of Nature (“Encyclopédie”, Enc. V: 641b)
One consideration above all must not be lost sight of, and that is
that if man or the thinking, contemplating being is banished from
the surface of the earth, this moving and sublime spectacle of
nature becomes nothing but a sad and mute scene…. Everything
changes into a vast solitude where unobserved phenomena occur in
a manner dark and mute. (Enc. V: 641c)
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“Why not make man the center of our work?” The anthropocentrism here
is of course not one which appeals to a human essence, or special dignity
including some purported superiority we might possess over animals. It is
rather a pragmatic position according to which schemes like the
Encyclopédie, but also the arts, sciences and technological pursuits
narrated in that work, serve to make that “landscape” meaningful.
3. Conclusion
For Diderot, there is only one substance and it is material. Here, he is
loosely aligned with Spinoza. But this substance is in perpetual flux (a
more Lucretian element in his thought), so that the individual beings we
encounter are merely temporary, provisional clusters of molecules in
interaction with one another, in the midst of what he terms the general
“vicissitude” of the cosmos (by which he means its change). In the entry
“Immuable” (“Immutable”) he writes that “Nature is in a state of perpetual
vicissitude. It follows from the general law of all bodies: either they are in
motion, or they tend to be in motion” (Enc. VIII: 577).
Borrowing a Heraclitean motif and adding a now rather dated gender
inflection, Diderot also describes Nature as a woman who enjoys disguises
(IN, § XII, doubtless alluding to Heraclitus’ phusis kruptesthai philei,
“Nature likes to hide”, frag. 208). This is also why there are no monsters
in any real sense:
I speak of monstrosity relative to what they are at present, for there
are no monsters relative to the whole …. If everything is in fluxu,
which we can hardly doubt, all beings are monstrous, that is, more
or less incompatible with their corresponding order. (OH; DPV
XXIV: 317, 403)
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The matter of which we, as well as all other entities in the universe, are
composed, is heterogeneous: differing in terms of energy and sensitivity,
and in perpetually evolving relation to the Whole:
That is, Nature is both fundamentally heterogeneous (the atoms which
compose the natural world exist in a state of heterogeneity and agitation)
and never entirely “specific”:
All beings
In this ever-changing Whole, there are provisional constructs and entities
that are, like everything else, wholly material, but can be of greater or
lesser significance to us, whether this is “cashed out” aesthetically,
emotionally, ethico-politically or even in terms of nerve impulses (and
Diderot, most of the time, is not wont to distinguish sharply between
these).
The world is ceaselessly beginning and ending; it is at every
moment at the beginning and at the end; it never had, and never
will have any other. In this vast ocean of matter, not one molecule
resembles another, not one molecule is self-identical for one
moment. (RA; DPV XVII: 128)
each thing is more or less specific (quelconque), more or less earth,
more or less water, more or less air, more or less fire; more or less
belonging to one kingdom or another … hence there is no essence
of a particular being. (RA; DPV XVII: 138)
have an infinite number of relations to one another, according to
the qualities they have in common; … it is a certain assemblage of
qualities which characterizes them and distinguishes them (BI;
DPV III: 183)
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Diderot invented a new form of materialism, drawing on a variety of
sources including the Epicurean tradition, Hobbes and Locke, Spinoza and
Leibniz. He also transformed doctrines, genres and nascent intellectual
constellations (skepticism, the philosophical novel, and eclecticism, to
name some instances). Even if he did not wish to contribute to the genre of
systematic philosophy, his contribution to the Enlightenment (and its
posterity) and to subsequent intellectual episodes is considerable, difficult
to measure, and should be engaged with.
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Biography of Diderot
The arc of Diderot’s long, varied, and eventful life can be summarized by
reducing it to four distinct phases:
1. a period of maturation amidst struggle in the 1730s and 40s as the
impoverished young Diderot sought to establish himself as a self-
sustaining adult in Old Regime Paris through the pursuit of the highly
precarious vocation of writing and publishing;
2. a period of intellectual ascent after 1749 as Diderot used the new
financial stability and intellectual notoriety acquired through his
supervision of the epochal Encyclopédie project to build a base for
his mature career as an Enlightenment writer, critic, and philosophe;
3. a period of intellectual celebrity as the new freedom brought about by
the final completion of the Encyclopédie project in 1765 allowed
Diderot to produce some of his most important, if often unpublished,
work;
4. a twilight period begun in 1773 after his financial burdens were fully
eliminated through the lucrative patronage offered by Empress
Catherine the Great of Russia, a period when Diderot brought to
completion the wider philosophical program established earlier, while
adding a new strand of political radicalism to the mix.
Each of these four phases is discussed below, in its own section.
1. Years of Formation and Struggle (1713–1749)
1.1 Earliest Career as a Writer
1.2 Intellectual Breakthrough and Public Debut in the 1740s
1.3 Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient
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1.4 Success, Scandal, and Imprisonment in 1749
2. Ascendance as Writer and Philosophe through the
Encyclopédie(1750–1765)
2.1 The Encyclopédie Project
2.2 The Scandal of the Encyclopédie
2.3 The Prades Affair
2.4 The Suspension of the Encyclopédieand its Completion in
Exile
3. The Years of Celebrity (1765–1773)
3.1 Philosophical Investigations in the Manner of the 1740s
3.2 Le Rêve de D’Alembert
3.3 Diderot’s Plays, Novels, and Literary Essays from the 1760s
and 1770s
3.4 Diderot’s Invention of Public Art Criticism
3.5 Le Neveu de Rameau
4. Twilight Years (1774–1784)
4.1 Diderot and Empress Catherine the Great of Russia
4.2 The Late Writings
4.3 The Posthumous Legacy
1. Years of Formation and Struggle (1713–1749)
Born in 1713 in Langres, a middling cathedral town in central France
about 300 kilometers southeast of Paris, Diderot began life with very little
pointing him toward his future as a world renowned writer and
intellectual. His father was an artisan cutler who hoped his son would rise
above him into a career in the liberal professions, and since Langres
possessed a Jesuit college, Diderot’s father enrolled him there in an effort
to give him the education necessary for social uplift. His ambitions were
rewarded when Denis graduated with prizes in rhetoric and mathematics,
an event that Diderot once described as his father’s proudest moment.
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While still under the tutelage of the Jesuits, Diderot contemplated an
ecclesiastical career, a common method of Old Regime social uplift that
would have provided him with a regular, salaried life in the manner
dreamed for him by his father. He went far enough to be tonsured in 1726,
but stopped short of full ordination, and after his academic success,
Diderot’s family supported his move to Paris around 1729 in order to
continue his studies and find a professional calling. This led to more
education, including the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree awarded in
1732 by the Collège d’Harcourt in Paris, and three more years studying
natural philosophy and theology at the Sorbonne. Law was another
professional option available to him, but after an unhappy apprenticeship
with an attorney, Diderot left this behind as well. Little documentation
exists regarding this period in Diderot’s life, but what is clear is that he
found in Paris a thriving center of ideas and urban sociability, and out of
his immersion in this world as a student, his career began to move on a
different track.
1.1 Earliest Career as a Writer
He made his way during these years through work as a piece writer in the
vibrant but economically constrained world of Parisian publishing.
D’Alembert would later romanticize the life of the poor but fully
independent writer as an ideal to which all honnêtes gens de lettres should
aspire. But as the illegitimate son of a wealthy aristocrat who provided for
him financially, D’Alembert never actually lived the impoverished
bohemian writer’s life in the flesh. Diderot did, and during these early
years he struggled continuously to eke out a minimal existence through
occasional work with his pen. Money came from journalists who paid him
by the word to provide content for their weekly and monthly periodicals.
In this way, Diderot penned many of the anonymous book reviews that
were a staple of these journals even if there is no way to document
Diderot’s output today.
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Since he was also good with languages, especially English, a talent whose
source in Diderot’s biography is unclear (some say he taught himself using
a Latin-English dictionary), he also found work as a translator. His first
publishing success came in 1744 with his translation of Temple Stanyan’s
staid Grecian History, a work that earned him his first published notice in
the Journal des Savants as the book’s “rather negligent” translator. It also
earned him a meager payment of three hundred francs. He also showed his
interest in and expertise with the Enlightenment natural sciences through
his translation of Robert James’ dictionary of medical terms. More
translation work followed, and while the jobs helped him to increase his
public notoriety, they did not make him any more financially secure. His
financial hardship was intensified in 1743 when he chose to marry the
equally poor Antoinette Champion. The couple gave birth to a daughter
soon after their wedding, and while Diderot remained devoted to his wife
and child throughout his life, his marriage led his family in Langres to
renounce him completely, further increasing his hardship.
1.2 Intellectual Breakthrough and Public Debut in the 1740s
In the 1740s, amid his continuing poverty and social marginalization,
Diderot began to build the career as a writer and intellectual that would
make him famous. In 1742, he met the young Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a
key moment in the genesis of the philosophe movement that Rousseau
immortalized for posterity in his Confessions. Etienne Bonnot de
Condillac likewise joined their circle at this time, and together these three
would-be philosophes shared a bohemian writer’s life looking for public
acclaim and patronage (the two often went together) in the bustling circles
of lettered Parisian society. In this setting, and without any clear financial
return in mind as he made the effort, Diderot also began to write and
publish his own books. Through them, and sociable circulation within the
urbane society of Paris, he began to establish his name and reputation as a
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philosophical author, one who from the start, and ever after, was
associated with the most radical and controversial ideas.
The diversity of Diderot’s textual output in the 1740s exemplifies the
crooked path of his ascent. It also illustrates the eclectic and sharp edged
character of Enlightenment philosophie. His first published work, which
appeared in 1745, continued in a way his work as a translator since it was
not a wholly original text, but a very loose translation of Anthony Ashley
Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury’s An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit.
Diderot’s text included a set of reflections in a prologue, and lengthy
footnotes providing further reflection on Shaftesbury’s ideas, which
Diderot shared. These included Shaftesbury’s naturalist and loosely
materialist and deist leanings. The Jesuit-edited Journal de Trévoux
captured the spirit of the book rightly, if not affectionately, when it called
it a “discourse on morality as if written by Mr. Locke”. The Locke
referenced here was the author of the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, a work which to many French readers in 1745 amounted
to a treatise on materialist metaphysics. This treatise showed how human
consciousness could be viewed as a phenomenon derived from matter and
motion alone, or so those worried about such ideas claimed. This
materialist Locke, who allegedly wondered whether matter could think,
circulated in eighteenth-century France as one of many specters
constituting the wider philosophical danger interchangeably called deism,
atheism, materialism, and Spinozism. From the beginning, and throughout
his life, Diderot willingly cavorted with those who danced with these
philosophical spectres.
His second book, published in 1746, which was also his first with no
connection to translation, implicated him at the heart of this very coven.
Called Pensées philosophiques, it offered, as its title suggested, a series of
provocative philosophical propositions that suggested theses and
arguments related to questions of matter, motion, nature, science, and
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philosophy. No single argument unified the book, and while its contents
were certainly natural philosophical, it is difficult to find a single theory or
hypothesis that ties everything in it together. Instead, it is a book of
provocative statements and theses to argue with. As such, it inaugurated
an important feature of Diderot’s overall philosophy: its dialogic and
intersubjective character.
Diderot’s first two books announced the eclectic approach to philosophie
that would be his hallmark, and having launched this pattern his next
works only added further diversity to his emerging oeuvre. La Promenade
du sceptique, which was written at this time but only published a century
later, defies any precise genre classification. A sort of philosophical
dialogue, but one that also draws from the emerging sensibilities of the
Enlightenment epistolary novel, the text takes its readers on a kind of
intellectual journey where the worlds of the various philosophical sects are
visited—travel narratives, including those to extraterrestrial worlds, were
another intertextual referent used by Diderot. The reader of La Promenade
du sceptique encounters Pyrrhonians, Spinozists, deists, idealists (i.e.
Berkeley), and more, yet no voice of overarching unification or
synthesizing argument is present. Diderot’s next book, published in 1748,
was radically different in genre, if no different in its interrogative
philosophical intent. Called Les Bijoux indiscrets, it is best described as a
work of philosophical pornography since the story involves a Sultan’s
magical ring that provokes female genitalia to speak of their experiences.
This results in a text that intersperses bawdy sexual stories with discourses
on such philosophical topics as the relationship between “Experience” and
“Hypothesis” and the merits of “Newtonian” as opposed to “Cartesian”
natural philosophy. Les Bijoux indiscrets brought an exceptionally large
and welcome financial return to Diderot, and it remains his most published
book.
1.3 Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient
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The climax of this decade of prolific literary output occurred in 1749 with
the publication of Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient, one
of Diderot’s masterpieces and arguably his most sophisticated and
complex philosophical text after Le Rêve de D’Alembert and Le Neveu de
Rameau. Classifying this work into any single genre is even less easy to
do than with the others Diderot wrote in the 1740s. Perhaps the best short
description of the book is the one offered by Diderot biographer Arthur N.
Wilson, who simply called it “disarming” (1972: 97). Taking flight as a
series of reflections on the blind English mathematician Nicholas
Saunderson, the Lettre sur les aveugles is written, says Wilson, “with the
easy artfulness of someone idly improvising on a musical instrument”. Yet
as it gets going, the breeziness of the text subtly becomes more ponderous.
“One subject suggests another”, Wilson writes, and soon the reader is “led
on and on through a sort of steeplechase over the various metaphysical
jumps until finally he gets himself soaked in the waterhole called ‘Does
God Exist?’” (1972: 97).
1.4 Success, Scandal, and Imprisonment in 1749
Diderot’s public acclaim as a brilliant writer and philosophical esprit fort
increased in step with the advancing acclaim of these books, and by the
time that the Lettre had appeared he had become famous enough for
Voltaire himself, already the public face of radical philosophie because of
his vigorous campaigns on behalf of Newtonianism, to write to Diderot
praising his books and inviting him to join him for a “philosophical
supper”. The connection with Voltaire would prove fundamental for
Diderot in the years to come, but if his arrival as a new philosophical star
in Voltaire’s orbit illustrates his rapid ascent after 1745, it also explains the
new interest that Diderot was attracting within the French police.
Diderot published all of his initial books anonymously, bypassing in this
way the censorship regime that regulated the book trade in absolutist
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France. Anonymous publication by itself was not illicit, but given the
content of his books and his evasion of the royal censors that secured a
book’s legality, Diderot’s publications in the 1740s constituted a double
provocation. A police file with Diderot’s name on it was opened soon after
the Pensées philosophiques appeared, and the Parisian Parlement, the
judicial organ of the French state, expressed its support for the new
scrutiny of this author when it ordered the Pensées publicly burned in July
1746. As his next books appeared, Diderot became the target of vigorous
police surveillance, and by 1749 the evidence pointing to Diderot’s
authorship of these subversive works was conclusive. The publication of
Lettre sur les aveugles sealed the case, and soon after its appearance a
lettre de cachet was issued ordering Diderot’s incarceration in the royal
prison at Vincennes. The letter was executed in July 1749, and Diderot
spent three months in jail before his release the following November.
2. Ascendance as Writer and Philosophe through the
Encyclopédie (1750–1765)
The coincidence of the arrival of Voltaire’s first letter to Diderot inviting
him to join him in philosophical camaraderie and Diderot’s imprisonment
at Vincennes can serve as the transition point marking the second phase of
Diderot’s life. The arrival of Voltaire in Diderot’s life brought two
immediate changes that would mark his years of maturity. First, their
union constitutes a key moment in the genesis of the philosophe party, an
association that would ever after mark Diderot as a subversive thinker at
odds with the intellectual establishment. Second, and rather ironically, his
association with Voltaire also provided him with a new kind of security
since it brought him into the fold of the political authorities sympathetic to
controversial thinkers and writers like the philosophes.
Voltaire had established the persona of the radical philosophe as outlaw
after 1734 when he escaped his own lettre de cachet by fleeing to the
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sovereign chateau of an established aristocrat at Cirey in the Champagne
east of Paris. Voltaire’s protector in this case was the wife of the said
sovereign aristocrat, Emilie le Tonnier de Breteuil, the Marquise du
Châtelet, who happened also to be Voltaire’s intellectual partner and a
serious scientific intellectual in her own right. Emilie du Châtelet was
pregnant when Voltaire wrote to Diderot in June 1749, and she died in
September during childbirth while Diderot was serving his sentence at
Vincennes. Yet her influence survived her death since, by coincidence, a
member of the du Châtelet family was then serving as warden of the
Vincennes prison. Thanks to his influence, and that of other royal officials
sympathetic to Voltaire, Diderot’s time in prison was made much less
onerous than it might have been.
2.1 The Encyclopédie Project
When Diderot was released from prison in November 1749, he was
already at work on a new project, the one that would fully launch him to
global intellectual fame. The origins of this project went back to the very
beginning of Diderot’s life as an author, and especially to his initial work
as a translator. In 1745, a Parisian publisher named André-François Le
Breton secured an official privilège to publish a complete French
translation of Ephraim Chambers’ 1728 Cyclopedia, or Universal
Dictionary of Arts and Sciences. In June 1746, Breton gave editorial
control of the project to a rather undistinguished member of the Académie
Royale des Sciences, the abbé de Gua de Malves, who in turn appointed
two assistants: his academic colleague D’Alembert and Diderot. A week
after receiving his appointment, Diderot’s Pensées philosophiques was
publicly burned by the Parlement de Paris, yet undeterred Diderot began
at the same moment to assert his influence over the shape of the
encyclopedia project. In October 1747, De Gua de Malves stepped down,
ceding complete control of the project to D’Alembert and Diderot. In June
1748, a new privilège for the book was obtained as a result of a change in
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its conception. Now titled Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Universel des
sciences, des arts, et des métiers the work was beginning to lose its
character as a translation and starting to become a new and original
publication. Diderot pushed the book even further in this innovative
direction, and when he took up residence in his cell at Vincennes, the
Encyclopédie project was very much on his mind. Among his visitors
while in prison, in fact, were D’Alembert and Le Breton, who expressed
worries about the impact of Diderot’s imprisonment on the book’s sales.
Within a year after Diderot’s release, in November 1750, Le Breton
released eight thousand copies of a “Prospectus” for the work, a text
authored by Diderot, which invited readers to buy advanced subscriptions
for a radically new kind of compendium. The “Prospectus” promised that
the first volume of the new work would appear within six months. In the
Prospectus, Diderot began to reveal his conception of what the
Encyclopédie would become. No longer a translation of someone else’s
book, and even less a staid compendium of already established learning,
the Encyclopédie was always imagined by Diderot as a dynamic site of
living thought, an engine for changing, not codifying, existing knowledge.
Diderot would more fully develop the ideas first articulated in the
“Prospectus” in his article “Encyclopédie”, which was published in
volume V of the work in November 1755.
2.2 The Scandal of the Encyclopédie
1750 saw the full launch of the Encyclopédie project, along with all of the
intellectual transformations that would follow in its train, including the
controversies that would forever shape its legacy and that of its editors.
Diderot’s scandals of the previous year were certainly in readers’ minds as
they read his announcement of the new encyclopedia project, and other
events were also in the air making 1750 a moment ripe with
transformative potential. A series of controversial philosophical books had
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just appeared, including Condillac’s 1746 Essai sur l’origine des
connaissances humaines, Montesquieu’s 1748 De L’Esprit des Lois, and
the first volume of Buffon’s l’Histoire naturelle, which appeared in 1749.
Looking back, many have seen 1750 as the year when the French
Enlightenment battle between orthodox and heterodox thought, and
especially between skepticism and faith, truly began. Appearing at exactly
this moment, and poking at precisely these fault-lines, the Encyclopédie,
and especially Diderot’s work within it, has been viewed by many as the
match that ignited these cultural fires. Diderot also played a singularly
important role in directing these fires into the historically transformative
conflagration of the French Enlightenment.
Whatever its prior preparation, the launch of the Encyclopédie in
November 1750 provoked a war between its editors and the religious
authorities in France. At the heart of the struggle were the French
members of the Society of Jesus. In 1701, the order’s professors at its
leading Parisian college began to edit a learned periodical in the provincial
city of Trévoux. By 1750 this Jesuit Journal de Trévoux had become a
well-respected organ of learned commentary, one with a particular
reputation for aggressive critique on matters of religion and faith. When
the “Prospectus” for the Encyclopédie appeared, its lead editor Father
Guillaume-François Berthier, S.J. continued this tradition by taking up his
pen to rail against the new encyclopedia project and its editors. Diderot
replied in kind in his Lettre au R. P. Berthier, a pamphlet that deployed the
witty, satirical tone that had characterized his books of the 1740. He also
defended directly the intellectual programs that he had announced in his
“Prospectus”. Accordingly, as the first volumes began to appear they
entered an intellectual field already polarized by arguments between public
clerics and philosophes.
The rancor intensified when Volume I, containing all of the entries starting
with the letter “A”, appeared. Berthier found in this first volume, along
Charles T. Wolfe and J.B. Shank
Summer 2019 Edition 75
with many other provocations, the multi-authored article “Ame” (Soul),
which Diderot contributed to significantly. It deployed a full materialist
arsenal to lay out the contemporary understanding of this term and its
relationship (usually opposed) to traditional Thomist and Christian
philosophy, along with its affinities with ancient pagan understandings.
While the article on the soul was a masterpiece of serious philosophical
reasoning and argument, Berthier also encountered Diderot’s
characteristically witty and sarcastic brand of philosophie in other articles
in the inaugural volume as well, and overall he found many reasons to
worry about Diderot’s orthodoxy and his commitment to upholding
traditional canons of thought and morality.
No better illustration exists than the entry in Volume I for
“Anthropophagie” (Cannibalism). In the “Prospectus”, Diderot had
discussed the organization of knowledge appropriate for a new
encyclopedia, and among the themes he stressed was his dynamic
understanding of the Encyclopédie as a living work that must incorporate
the ever changing character of knowledge in its organization. As Diderot
explained, the Encyclopédie would never really be finished. As soon as
one article was completed, it would need to be updated, and new articles
not already included would need to be added all in an effort to contain all
of the new currents of thought coming into being at every moment. With
respect to the articles that were included, their relation to one another was
often as important as the discrete entry itself, he explained, since the real
meaning of any term was often best found in the connection between it
and various other words rather than in the single definition itself. Diderot
therefore adapted from Chambers’s work an explicit cross-referencing
system that used “renvois” added at the end of entries to point readers to
other articles that connected with or elaborated upon the material found in
each definition. The renvois system was not original to the Encyclopédie,
nor was the practice of cross-referencing in and of itself controversial, yet
Berthier found much to complain about in Diderot’s general tendency to
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use these and other aspects of the Encyclopédie to indulge in what he
found to be dangerous evasions and sometimes outright subversions of the
true foundations of knowledge. The article “Anthropophagie” illustrates
well the sort of thing that provoked these worries. After a fairly prosaic
summary of the practice of cannibalism as it was described in travelers’
accounts of the known anthropophages extant in the Americas, the article,
which was not authored by Diderot and was imported largely intact from
Chambers’s work, ended with a renvoi that pointed readers to another
article where further understanding regarding the human eating of other
men could be found. The article suggested was “Eucharistie”. Berthier did
not specifically note this article in his attacks upon Diderot and his
encyclopedic agenda, but it was the presence of these and other moments
of willful impropriety that defined for the Jesuit the real agendas of the
project.
2.3 The Prades Affair
More gasoline was thrown on these erupting controversies a month after
Volume I of the compendium appeared when a friend of Diderot’s, and a
contributor to the Encyclopédie—he wrote the entry for “Theological
Certitude”—successfully defended his doctoral thesis in philosophy at the
Sorbonne. No questions were raised by the Parisian Doctors of Theology
who examined the thesis submitted by the abbé Jean-Martin Prades
entitled To the celestial Jerusalem: Upon what face is it that God has
disseminated the breath of life? (Jerusalem in coelesti: quis est ille in
facem Deus inspiravit spiraculus vitae?). However, after rumors began to
circulate—Diderot was likely behind many of them—suggesting that
Prades’s thesis contained overtly pagan and materialist arguments, the
Jesuits began to investigate.
In January 1751, after learning that Prades did in fact defend questionable
positions, such as that the soul is an unknown substance, sensations are the
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source of our ideas, and revealed religion is only natural religion in its
evolution, the Sorbonne renounced its support for the thesis and revoked
Prades’ degree. The Archbishop of Paris also issued a decree, days after
the appearance of Volume II of the Encyclopédie, condemning the thesis,
and the Parlement de Paris supported the judgment by ordering the text of
the thesis to be publicly burned. A month later, the Jesuit Father Jean-
Baptiste Geoffroy, a colleague of Berthier, also published a pamphlet fully
exposing the connections between Prades, Diderot, and the Encyclopédie
project.
On February 7, the crown intervened in what was becoming a very heated
public scandal by suspending the publication privilège for the
Encyclopédie.Thanks to the favor that Diderot and his partners now
enjoyed among those in the upper echelons of the French government,
however, the suspension only lasted until the heat of the controversy had
subsided. Volume III appeared in early 1753, accompanied by a new
advertisement written by d’Alembert reassuring readers about the
continuing vitality of the project (subscribers in particular were promised a
full return on their payments). Thanks to this settlement, Volumes IV–VI
appeared between 1754–1756, and while these were accompanied by
ongoing criticism of encyclopedia project by the Jesuits in the Journal de
Trévoux, no further threats to the existence of the project appeared.
2.4 The Suspension of the Encyclopédie and its Completion in Exile
The controversies over the Encyclopédie were not over, however, and
Diderot’s most difficult years with the project were still to come. The
event that triggered the return of unrest had little overtly to do with
philosophie unless one believed the stories linking the two that clerics and
other members of the parti dévot began to promulgate after the events
themselves took place. The drama occurred on 5 January 1757, as King
Louis XV walked from the Royal Palace of Versailles to his awaiting
Denis Diderot
78 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
carriage. Out of the assembled crowd an obscure house servant named
Robert-François Damiens rushed past the royal bodyguards and stabbed
the king with a small penknife. The wound was anything but life
threatening, but the attempted lethal attack on the sacred body of the
sovereign was nevertheless an egregious transgression, one punishable by
the most extreme measures.
The subsequent execution of Damiens has since become legendary
because of its use for the last time in French history of the traditional
method of drawing and quartering the assassin’s body by harnessed
horses, an event that has become famous through the grisly description of
it offered by Michel Foucault in the opening of his widely read Surveiller
et punir. In the context of the discussion here, however, the significance of
the attempted regicide is more to be found in the perceived motivations
said to have led Damiens to his action. The police interrogation reveals a
highly emotional man moved passionately by the contemporary clerical
divisions that were pitting Jansenists, Jesuits, and the French episcopacy
against one another in battles over proper Church orthodoxy. Yet in a
distillation that would prove influential in shaping the fate of Diderot, and
the Encyclopédieproject overall, many high officials began to link
Damiens’s purported madness to the unchecked spread of dangerous and
subversive philosophie in France.
The new climate of opinion was institutionalized four months after the
attempted royal assassination when the Parlement de Paris issued a new
edict prescribing either the death penalty or service in the galleys for any
author or publisher convicted of publishing tendentious or clandestine
works. New critics of the Encyclopédie also appeared, writers who joined
with the Jesuits in condemning the subversive effects of the compendium
and its agendas. Especially virulent was the journalist Elie Fréron who
used his journal Année Littéraire to launch a sustained and persistent
attack on the project and its editors after 1757. Works with a similar, if less
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vitriolic, slant also appeared as pamphlets or as articles published in
periodicals, such as the future Royal Historiographer Moreau’s
assessment, published in June 1757 in the Mercure de France. This piece
spoke of an “Encyclopedist party” organized for the purpose of attacking
morality, religion and government. When Volume VII of the Encyclopédie
appeared in November 1757, not quite a year after Damiens’s attack, the
tinder was therefore set for a new eruption of controversy. This time
D’Alembert found himself at the center of the cross-hairs for his article
“Geneva”, which outraged Genevan pastors because of his overly
sympathetic treatment of Socinianism and of natural religion in general,
and angered the pious through its defense of the public value of theater.
The controversy led D’Alembert to resign as editor in January 1758, and
although he returned a few months later, he resigned permanently the
following year, putting Diderot in sole control of the project and its public
relations.
The final blow against the Encyclopédie occurred in July 1758 when
Claude-Adrien Helvétius published On the Mind (De l’Esprit), one of the
most overtly materialist and heterodox works of philosophy to be
published during the French Enlightenment. Although Helvétius was not
technically an encyclopédiste, he certainly moved in the same circles, and
his work fit comfortably with the imaginary template of subversive
materialist philosophie crystallized after the Damiens Affair. Accordingly,
as the officials in charge of securing public order, morality, and the book
trade—the three were one in absolutist France—began to crack down on
Helvétius and De l’Esprit, the Encyclopédie found itself pulled into the
courts as a supposed accomplice aiding and abetting its crimes against
religion, morality, and public order.
The publication privilège for De l’Esprit was revoked a month after the
book appeared, and three months later the Archbishop of Paris publicly
condemned the book. This led the Parlement de Paris to pursue inquiries
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into a series of works it deemed subversive, including De l’Esprit. These
included the Encyclopédie. In January 1759, the Parlement condemned
them together along with several other books for their license and impiety.
While the judges further ordered the public burning of De l’Esprit, they
refrained from issuing the same order for the Encyclopédie, passing the
work instead to a committee of theologians, lawyers and scholars who
were charged with making corrective revisions. Royal authorities
confirmed the condemnation in March, revoking the original publication
privilège awarded for the Encyclopédie, an act that in effect turned the
volumes into illegal, subversive books.
D’Alembert treated this decision as the death sentence for the project, and
he immediately resigned as editor, never to return to the project again.
Diderot responded less pessimistically, for his protectors within the
monarchy remained, and a deal was struck that allowed the work to be
completed. Thanks to an ad hoc and secretive agreement, work on the final
ten volumes was allowed to continue after 1759, leading to the publication
en masse of the full work in 1765. Each of these volumes carried an
imprimatur indicating publication in Neuchâtel as a way of complying
with the royal ban. In this under the table way, the technically illicit book
continued to be printed and circulated, allowing the subscriber’s advanced
payments to be redeemed and their volumes delivered. Meanwhile, during
the same years, the volumes of accompanying plates began to appear since
their privilège was distinct and had not been revoked in 1759. Between
1765–1772, the final volumes of the plates were published to accompany
the seventeen volumes of text that were already in print, and with that the
entire Encyclopédie was brought to completion.
Yet even with the text suppressed until 1765, and only the volumes of
plates appearing, the controversy for Diderot continued throughout the
early 1760s. The public absence of new volumes of encyclopedic text did
little to stop the flow of criticism of Diderot and his imagined
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“Encyclopédiste party”. Charles Pallisot de Montenoy’s satirical play Les
Philosophes, staged in Paris in 1760, was one widely noticed example of
the wider anti-philosophe campaign, which intensified in this period and
placed Diderot at its center. Although focused more on Rousseau and
Montesquieu than Diderot and the encyclopédistes, Pallisot’s satire
attracted large audiences to the spectacle of philosophers, like those
involved in the Encyclopédie project, supposedly behaving badly in ways
that undermined religion, civility, and social order. Many other works
joined in this chorus during these years, and taken as a whole the public
campaign against Diderot and the Encyclopédie provided him with a
persistent stream of background noise, and an occasional sting that needed
a slap, as he otherwise went about the difficult, and now unaided, work of
completing the Encyclopédie project.
3. The Years of Celebrity (1765–1773)
In 1765, after the final appearance of all seventeen volumes of the text of
the Encyclopédie, and with only a few volumes of plates still remaining to
be printed, Diderot experienced a kind of liberation as his life was freed
from the work that had occupied most of his time and energy over the
previous fifteen years. A first step in this direction occurred in 1759 with
the revocation of the royal permission to publish the Encyclopédie and
d’Alembert’s definitive resignation as editor. In one respect, this change
increased his burdens by making him the sole editor responsible for
completing the project. But it also eased his strain in other ways since the
revocation ended the bitter public and political struggle that Diderot had
fought throughout the 1750s to keep the project alive. During the 1760s,
Diderot continued to do what was necessary to see the Encyclopédie
project completed, a job that was by no means easy—he ultimately
authored nearly six thousand articles himself. But from 1760 forward he
no longer needed to divide his time between doing this work and
sustaining the public battles on behalf of Encyclopédie as before.
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Accordingly, the years after 1760 brought a new quiet and calm into
Diderot’s life as he retreated in some respects to the background of the
philosophe movement, and let others, especially Voltaire, who became
newly assertive at precisely this moment, move to the front as the public
face of philosophie. Since the controversy surrounding the
Encyclopédiehad also contributed, as public controversies always do, to
improved sales of the books, Diderot also found himself in the 1760s with
even more financial security than ever before. He remained anything but
rich, but he no longer struggled as before to meet his basic needs. His
public acclaim had also created a welcoming place for him among certain
sympathetic Parisian elites, and as the burdens of the Encyclopédie project
became less heavy—he once called it his hair shirt—he began to enjoy for
the first time some of the leisure afforded to well-connected writers like
him by Enlightenment Parisian society.
With this liberation, a highly productive period in his life began as new
and original books and other writings began to flow from his pen. His
previous struggles still influenced this output, for after a stint in prison and
two decades of surveillance and harassment by the French authorities
responsible for the book trade, Diderot had become far more suspicious of
publication than he had been in his youth. His output during these years
was great, and his correspondence reveals a lively circulation of his
writings among trusted friends and collaborators. Nevertheless, few of
Diderot’s writings after 1760 found their way directly into print, and even
fewer made it there with his approval. Many of his writings from this
period were only discovered and published much later, some as much as a
century after his death. Diderot also expressed an awareness of how his
continual struggle with censors affected his manner of writing. As he once
wrote, “I saved myself by writing laconically and with generalities and
obscurity, and by finding the most intricate ironic tone I could find” (OH,
DPV XXIV: 409).
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Scholars working with Diderot’s letters and manuscripts have established
an imprecise chronology for his output, and that will be followed here. But
since this mature period in Diderot’s life also marks his move into a
manner of working where he simultaneously developed several distinct, if
always related, strands of thought all at once, a chronological approach is
not an effective way to capture his thinking and writing during these years.
Much better is to group his work thematically according to the broad
clusters of thought that his books and other writings contributed to.
3.1 Philosophical Investigations in the Manner of the 1740s
Diderot’s earliest writings from this period, pursued while the
Encyclopédie project was still ramping up to full speed, continued the
philosophical and literary explorations initiated in the 1740s. Some of
these works passed directly into print, while others remained private
works that Diderot kept from the public eye for reasons that are often hard
to discern. In 1751 he published anonymously and without privilège a
continuation of sorts of his Lettre sur les aveugles entitled Lettre sur les
sourds et muets à l’usage de ceux qui entendent et qui parlent. At the same
time, he also expanded upon his Pensées philosophiques by writing, and
perhaps allowing into print (the 1754 print edition of the book is devoid of
any indication about its origin), Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, a
work that retains the episodic, propositional structure of Diderot’s original
Pensées philosophiques while expanding the explanations within each
section.
Scholars have also suggested, though never proven definitively, that
Diderot contributed during these years to Baron d’Holbach’s Système de la
Nature, ou Des Loix du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral first
published in 1770. This book stands alongside Helvétius’ De l’Esprit as
one of the great masterpieces of French Enlightenment materialist
philosophy and natural religion, a touchstone of Diderot’s thought as well.
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D’Holbach contributed almost four hundred articles to the Encyclopédieon
topics ranging from natural philosophy and religion to mineralogy, and
Diderot was also at the center of the coterie that assembled every week in
the philosophical salon that the Baron hosted within the secure confines of
his hôtel on the rue Royale in Paris, the circle that brought Système de la
nature to life. Diderot certainly contributed to the work in this way, but in
its dry and programmatic systematicity, d’Holbach’s book also lacks the
lively play of Diderot’s best philosophical writing. Whatever his direct
textual influence on the book, it is certain that he and D’Holbach were
kindred spirits, and that Diderot’s own philosophical work was shaped by
the common agendas which both pursued during these years.
Diderot’s Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement,
written about the same time as Système de la Nature, and his Éléments de
physiologie and Réfutation d’Helvétius, written in the years soon after the
appearance of the treatise, though only published later in the nineteenth
century, also explore related themes. Taken as whole, all of these works
reflect Diderot’s lifelong preoccupation with materialist questions of life,
liberty, purpose, and and the question of order within a cosmos that may
not be governed by a providential creator. They also reveal his continuing
interest in the epistemological problem of discerning the nature and
principles of such a possibly God-less world. These themes run throughout
the entire corpus of his work, and if these writings are different it is in his
explicit engagement with explicitly materialist philosophical investigation
as they related to the emerging biological sciences of the eighteenth
century.
3.2 Le Rêve de D’Alembert
One of Diderot’s great masterpieces, certainly written during these years
but only published posthumously, should be included as a part of the
natural philosophical corpus summarized above even if it engages with the
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same seminal questions of natural philosophy in an overtly literary manner
that draws more on Enlightenment epistolary novels and theater for its
construction than the classical philosophical genres of antique philosophy.
Called Le Rêve de D’Alembert (D’Alembert’s Dream), the work is in fact a
trilogy of dialogues whose centerpiece is a dialogue from which the title is
drawn. It narrates a report given to the Encyclopédiste and doctor M.
Bordeu of ravings overheard at D’Alembert’s beside by the Parisian
salonnière Mlle. de Lespinasse. The reports of D’Alembert’s dreams are
situated between two further dialogues, the Entretien entre D’Alembert et
Diderot, which precedes and sets up the dream reporting, and the Suite de
l’entretien, which reflects on it while broaching “social” topics through
imaginings about the possibility of biogenetic engineering of society. The
character D’Alembert, who serves as a continuous thread tying the three
dialogues together, is treated ironically, given that in the first dialogue his
character has a debate with the character Diderot, in which the former
defends a kind of Cartesian substance dualism, while in the next dialogue,
his dream-utterances reveal a kind of materialist ‘truth’ which D’Alembert
has presumably repressed. In this way, Diderot the author moves between
conscious and unconscious thought so as to shift perspectives and
highlight the different possibilities that follow from these different points
of view.
Taken as a whole, these three interconnected dialogues operate at two
levels, inquiring at once into serious metaphysical and epistemological
questions regarding a materialist understanding of being and order in the
world, while at the same time staging a highly self conscious textual
performance that brings into focus the style of the conversation attendant
to the philosophical exchanges themselves. Diderot’s early published
works had this same double quality, both philosophical and artfully
literary, yet unlike these earlier works, Le Rêve de D’Alembert was never
published by Diderot, and in fact remained buried in his manuscripts until
discovered and published in the late nineteenth century. Le Rêve de
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D’Alembert was nevertheless one of Diderot’s favorite works (along with
his mathematical essays), and he gave one copy to Catherine the Great as a
gift, together, significantly in terms of his understanding of its place within
his oeuvre, with a set of “Fragments” that he presented as belonging to his
physiological writings.
The substance of Le Rêve de D’Alembert reveals some of Diderot’s most
important thinking about metaphysics as it relates to biology and the life
sciences. The first dialogue, between Diderot and D’Alembert, covers
traditional philosophical issues such as self and world, matter and thought,
the existence of God, sensation and the true properties of objects. The
second and longest dialogue involves the somnolent D’Alembert, the
doctor Bordeu, and Mlle de Lespinasse, and it contains the dream
reporting noted above. This is the central dialogue of the text. The third
dialogue is shorter again, and involves only Doctor Bordeu and Mlle de
Lespinasse discussing certain issues from the dream reporting at the heart
of the main dialogue. Topics here include monsters considered as
biological and social problems, the relation between matter and sensation,
and the nature of biological reproduction with explicit attention to its
sexual dimension. Antique philosophy is also referenced throughout,
especially antique atomism, and in an earlier conception Diderot imagined
his dialogue as a conversation between figures drawn from antiquity that
would have been titled Le Rêve de Démocrite. Diderot’s commitment to
modern materialist philosophy was nevertheless the engine driving all of
this complex literary and philosophical play, and Le Réve de D’Alembert
accordingly contains some of Diderot’s most aggressive materialist
explorations. Since it would certainly have been considered a subversive
work had it been published when it was written, this may explain
Diderot’s suppression of it. Overall, it is still an open question within
Diderot studies why he wrote the work the way he did at the time when he
wrote it, and how one should interpret the uniquely Diderotian mode of
philosophizing present in the text. What is clear, however, is that the
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creative complexity converges into what is without question one of the
great masterpieces of Enlightenment philosophie.
3.3 Diderot’s Plays, Novels, and Literary Essays from the 1760s and 1770s
Le Rêve de D’Alembert continues to puzzle and fascinate readers because
of its alchemical fusion of literature and philosophy, textual play and
reasoned argumentation, in the pursuit of fundamental questions about the
world and humanity. The same mixture is also present in Diderot’s other
seemingly literary and artistic writings since these too contain much
serious science and philosophy as well.
One important cluster concerns the theory and practice of theater. Diderot
wrote scripts for plays that were staged in Paris, including Le Fils naturel
in 1757 and Le père de famille in 1758, but the character of these works as
theatrical productions is less interesting than his theorization of them
before and after the actual performance. As works of dramatic art,
Diderot’s plays are dominated by his particular ethical sensibilities, which
will be discussed in detail in Part II. His fusion of theater with moralizing
agendas led to what has come to be called Diderot’s drame bourgeois, a
label that suggests Diderot’s valorization of a morality rooted in the
supreme ethical value of the conjugal family and the virtues of thrift,
domestic love and piety. Diderot’s plays were moralizing melodramas that
celebrated this ethic, and the same impulses were present in his art
criticism in his praise for the moralizing paintings of Jean-Baptiste
Greuze, an artist who publicly visualized drame bourgeois in oil upon
canvas. His ethics were also present in his vigorous condemnation of the
rococo painter François Boucher, who he once described as a man “who
takes up his brush only so that he can show me breasts and buttocks”
(quoted in Kavanagh 2010, p. 81). Diderot also expressed these same
ethical principles as an economic theory when he defended the abbé
Galiani’s critique of the pro-luxury theories of the Physiocrats, and in his
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moralizing dialogue Entretien d’un père avec ses enfants, published in
Grimm’s Correspondance Littéraire in 1781, which describes a father
teaching his son about modesty and the value of family devotion.
Diderot’s drame bourgeois tends toward melodrama, and as such his plays
are not major touchstones in the history of theater. His meta-theoretical
writings about theater itself, however, provide many interesting points of
departure for his philosophy, and these will accordingly be discussed in
Part II. Diderot’s novels and other works of overt fiction also partake in
the aesthetic explorations that mark his best work on the theater. Jacques
le fataliste et son maître, for example, is a kind of anti-novel, modeled on
Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy. It strives to expose the novelistic
conceit of bringing its readers into a staged world of realistically
represented yet fictional human experience. In this, it shares with Diderot’s
writings on theater an interest in the nature and limits of representation
itself. Diderot’s story Ceci n’est pas un conte also operates in a similarly
self-conscious and critically subversive way, and in these and other
ostensibly literary works, as with his theater and art criticism, the explicit
play with form and content, and the self-aware consciousness about the
often unstable interaction between language, experience and their capacity
to merge (or not) into coherent representations, points to a theme present
in all of Diderot’s most sophisticated thought.
3.4 Diderot’s Invention of Public Art Criticism
Another site where Diderot manifest these same philosophical-literary
tendencies was in his art criticism. His work in this area began in 1759
when the journalist Friedrich Melchior Grimm invited Diderot to
contribute to his monthly journal Correspondence Littéraire by offering
his reflections on the art displayed at the biennial Parisian art salon. Staged
in the Louvre, these shows allowed painters and sculptors to showcase
their work in a setting that gave a broad public audience unprecedented
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access to the work of the best artists of the day. The Académie Royale de
peinture et de sculpture had been staging these shows for over two
decades when Diderot went to work, and while others had written
commentaries about the exhibitions before, no one before him had
provided anything like the critical philosophical assessment of the art of
the salons, its meaning, and its place in the world of Enlightenment
thought and culture more generally that he began to provide.
A new academically centered art theory had developed in the seventeenth
century, and by 1700 this was starting to be transformed into a new
philosophical science of aesthetics that spoke in general terms about ideal
theoretical concepts like artistic truth and beauty and their manifestation
through the work of practitioners of the fine arts. A new persona, the
connoisseur, had also become visible by 1750, a knower who helped
collectors to hone their judgment in discerning truly great art while
offering others the skills necessary to isolate real art from the mere craft of
ordinary artistic production. The bi-annual Parisian salons had already
become a site of Enlightenment aesthetics and connoisseurship by 1750,
yet before Diderot no one had brought together the job of the connoisseur
and the aesthetician with that of the public writer reflecting on art in
relation to ordinary human experience. In his “Salons”, as they came to be
called after they appeared in the Correspondance litteraire, Diderot
brought all of these agendas together into one discursive program. In
doing so, he invented a new identity defined by a new genre: the art critic
sustained through contemporary art criticism.
The social invention itself was transformative, but even more significant
was the character of the art criticism that Diderot developed in his
pioneering new role. Here Diderot worked through the medium of the
painted image to explore exactly the same dynamics between form and
content, author and interpreter, subject and object—in short, the very
problem of artistic representation itself—that he also explored in his
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theater, literary fiction, and often in his philosophy as well. The result was
a general understanding of aesthetics and its relationship to ethics that was
also integrally connected to his philosophy, and these ties will be
discussed in detail in Part II.
3.5 Le Neveu de Rameau
Diderot’s art criticism joined with his theater criticism, his novels, and his
other literary and philosophical writings in offering readers reflections on
deep metaphysical and epistemological questions as they relate to the
power and limits of representation. His explicitly metaphysical and
epistemological writings about nature, its character, and its interpretation
also join with this other work in forefronting writing and representation as
an empowering act of conscious human being and knowing, but also as a
fraught and frail human capacity full of limitations. His best works are
those that engage in both sides of this dynamic simultaneously in the
manner of his literary and dialogic metaphysics and materialist natural
philosophy.
From this perspective, it is appropriate that arguably Diderot’s greatest and
most influential text is a work of both literary fiction and a semi-
autobiographical psychological memoir, and a work that is at once a
theatrical send-up of Parisian society, an intimate portrait of contemporary
social mores, and a highly original and complex study of the nature of
human perception, being, and their interrelation. Called Le Neveu de
Rameau, the text ostensibly narrates Diderot’s meetings and then
conversation with the nephew of the renowned French composer Jean-
Philippe Rameau. Yet once introduced, the dialogue unfolds through a
back and forth between characters named “Moi” and “Lui”, or me and
him, continually turning a discussion between two discrete subjects into an
inner monologue of one subject dialoguing with himself. And as the
exchange carries on, one also comes to see the two characters as different
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sides of a deep existential dynamic that generates both the differences that
sustain the banter and the never ending circle of their debates. At this point
the external reality of the characters begins to dissolve, and “Moi” and
“Lui” start to become two competing principles within an intractable
universal ethical and metaphysical struggle.
Diderot did not publish Le Neveu de Rameau in his lifetime, but the text
found its way to Germany after his death, where it was read by Friedrich
Schiller and passed on to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe who then
published a German translation of the text of his own making in 1805.
From there, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel found the text, offering it as
the only external work explicitly cited in his Phenomenology of Spirit first
published in 1807. Diderot’s dialogue in fact exerted an important
influence on the formation of Hegel’s own dialectical understanding of
metaphysics and the the nature of being. In drawing these insights from
the text, Hegel was also following the deeper metaphysical understanding,
which Diderot himself developed in all of his writings and incorporated
into the book, no matter how different in genre and idiom Diderot’s
dialogue was when compared with Hegel’s ponderous and recondite
treatise. A line further connects Diderot and Le Neveu de Rameau with all
subsequent metaphysical understandings of the self as a singularity caught
in a constant struggle with universal forces pulling the unity of being
apart. It also connects the book with all metaphysical thinking after Hegel
that posits being as a unity riven with dialectical oppositions striving to
reconcile competing oppositions within being itself. That Diderot never
produced anything like a metaphysical treatise in the manner of Hegel’s
work in no way softens his influence on this tradition.
4. Twilight Years (1774–1784)
In October 1773, Diderot celebrated his sixtieth birthday in a coach
headed for the Russian imperial capital of St. Petersburg. The journey was
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provoked by a series of events begun in 1765 that radically altered
Diderot’s social position, if not necessarily the contours of his philosophy.
Although the Encyclopédie project and other developments after 1750 had
created a stable material foundation for him, making possible his
intellectual production over the subsequent decades, in 1765 he was still a
man living a very modest life in Paris with little by way of riches. His
international renown, by contrast, was enormous, and he was known and
admired by many who had both wealth and political power.
4.1 Diderot and Empress Catherine the Great of Russia
One admirer was the Empress Catherine the Great of Russia, who had
watched the development of the Encyclopédiewith great interest and
expressed her affection for French Enlightenment philosophie overall. In
her so called “Nakaz” or “Instruction” circulated to those below her in the
hierarchy of the Russian state, she laid out a program for governing the
Russian empire that was saturated with French Enlightenment ideas and
principles. She was particularly attracted to Diderot’s writings, and fate
provided her with an occasion to express her appreciation directly when a
financial burden forced Diderot to make a difficult decision. The dilemma
was how to provide a suitable dowry for his daughter so that she could
contract the kind of favorable marriage for her that he never experienced
with his own wife. He did not possess the resources to provide such a
dowry, so in 1765 he announced that he would sell his entire library to the
highest bidder as a way of fulfilling what he saw as his parental obligation.
When Catherine learned of the sale, she immediately made a lucrative
offer, and after her bid was accepted, she also told Diderot to set up her
new library in Paris, and to appoint himself as its permanent librarian. This
in effect allowed Catherine to give Diderot an annual pension that made
him a very wealthy man. From this date forward he was able to live with
an affluence he would never dreamed possible thirty years earlier.
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The journey to St. Petersburg followed seven years later as an opportunity
for Diderot to consult directly with the empress, and while his health was
in decline, making the voyage difficult for him, he described the encounter
pleasantly, saying that he spoke with the Russian Tsarina “man to man”.
He also offered her his own Observations sur le “Nakaz”, a document that
offers, along with his article “Droit naturel” (“Natural right”), one of the
clearest statements of Diderot’s political views. He urged Catherine to
promote greater equality, both politically and economically, and to
encourage less attachment to the Church. Catherine reported to a French
aristocrat afterwards that if Diderot’s suggestions were ever to be enacted,
chaos would ensue. Diderot also gave Catherine a plan for creating a new
university, one organized according to the latest thinking about modern
scientific knowledge. This document offers revealing insight into
Diderot’s thinking about the organization of knowledge and the state of
the disciplines two decades after his theorization of them for the
Encyclopédie.
4.2 The Late Writings
Diderot spent his sixty-first birthday in 1774 in a stagecoach heading back
home from St. Petersburg, and once re-installed in Paris in the new
comfort that Catherine’s library endowment made possible, he began a
kind of retirement where he continued to write while turning his attention
to a new topic: history. One example was his Essai sur les règnes de
Claude et de Néron, which reflected the turn of his continuing long
standing interest in ethics and morality toward questions of politics,
justice, and history. Also reflective of this new union was his intervention
in the final editions of the abbé Guillaume Thomas Raynal’s massive
global history entitled Histoire philosophique et politique des
établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes. This
book, which ran to nineteen volumes, was produced by Raynal in a
manner akin to the Encyclopédie, with numerous authors contributing and
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Raynal massaging the various contributions into a coherent whole. The
history overall was pioneering. Opening with the claim that no greater
change had occurred in all of world history than the one that ensued when
Columbus arrived in the Americas in 1492, opening up the Western
hemisphere for European global expansion and conquest, the book then
narrated the history of European globalization and empire since the
fifteenth century, ranging across India, China, Africa and the Pacific along
with a history of European exploration and conquest in the Americas.
No history like this had ever been written before, nor had any
compendium of this sort documenting European global expansion and
imperialism ever been assembled. The book lacks a single narrative voice,
and overall it is a loose baggy monster combining chapters full of
quantitative trade data and empirical natural history of the world’s material
resources together with theatrical speeches delivered by the book’s
historical actors and moralizing narratives of the calamities and triumphs
of European imperial history. Overall, the book does not offer a coherent,
unified world history in our modern sense, even if Diderot often used his
contributions to advance broad conceptual theories that prefigured the later
world-historical theorization of Hegel and Marx. It is better described as
the Enlightenment’s Encyclopédie of early modern globalization and
empire.
The analogy to the Encyclopédie project also fits with Diderot’s role in the
project, for having watched as his friend Raynal brought out the first two
print editions in 1770 and 1777, Diderot intervened in the final print
edition of 1780, offering a largely new set of dramatic narrations and
normative arguments about the book’s contents that gave the treatise as a
whole a new political edge.
Although it is difficult to summarize the variety of Diderot’s contributions,
one dominant theme was his exploration of the power of commerce,
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conceived as an autonomous natural historical force, to drive political and
social change. On some occasions he celebrates the power of commerce to
bring about the progress of civilization that he wants readers to see, a
position that makes him emblematic of what A.O. Hirschman has called
the “doux commerce” strand of Enlightenment political economy, a thread
crucial to the formation of modern liberalism. On other occasions,
however, Diderot decries the way that commercial greed and profit-
seeking produce outrageous violations of human decency and violence.
These are moments when his writings do not prefigure liberalism, but its
opposite, the anti-liberal critique of political economy that would later
become the basis of Marxism in the nineteenth century.
The Atlantic slave trade in particular attracted Diderot’s attention, and
some of his most passionate contributions to Raynal’s work involve
imagined dialogues about the horrors of the European imperial slave
system spoken by oppressed Africans. Diderot also exploits the global
frame of the book to situate his gaze in alien and non-European ways so
that he can assess and critique the history he is narrating. The result is a
kind of pioneering, if ad hoc and personal, universal anthropological
viewpoint that aspires to understand human life at the intersection of
history, culture and material existence as viewed from every point of view.
The Histoire philosophique des deux Indes which contains these passages
was a massive bestseller, translated into many languages, and it was a
direct influence on Hegel, and through him Marx, and through both on
modern world history more generally. Diderot’s contribution to this
influence was as important as any.
Diderot used the same proto-anthropological approach in another
provocative work from his later years, his Supplément au voyage de
Bougainville. This text offers an imagined dialogue between Tahitians and
Europeans about the different sexual, marital and familial mores of the
two cultures. In this dialogue, Diderot anticipates the figure of the native
Denis Diderot
96 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
ethnographer who asks comparative questions about the foundations of
morality and civilization so as to generate universal cultural
understandings through comparison. In the Histoire des deux Indes,
Diderot adds a political charge to such thinking by using the native stance
to indict the crimes of the European imperialist, but both this text and the
Supplément show Diderot’s interest in creating a reflexive universal
understanding of human values, society, and culture through the
perspectival exploration of the many different ways that perceiving
subjects and natural objects join together to produce one another.
In his Supplément, his contributions to Raynal’s Histoire, and his
Observations sur le “Nakaz”, Diderot appears in a newly radical political
guise as an aggressive egalitarian and democrat who has little patience
with traditional justifications for hierarchy and top down distributions of
power. He is also a passionate abolitionist with no tolerance for the crimes
of the Atlantic slave trade. These views connect him with Rousseau, who
would be canonized as the philosophe prophet of revolution by the radical
Jacobins who established the first French Republic. Several authors
including Michelet and Hugo exploited the trope “from Diderot sprang
Danton”. As Hugo wrote, “one can see Danton behind Diderot,
Robespierre behind Rousseau … the latter engendered the former” (Hugo
1876, vol. 7: 76, translation C. Wolfe). Yet while Hugo saw a
revolutionary link between the two Enlightenment philosophes, Diderot
was not canonized like Rousseau as a founding father of the French
revolutionary tradition. His ideas nevertheless pointed in many of the
same directions, and they also stem from his wider philosophy, especially
his metaphysics, in ways that make his political philosophy a more direct
precursor for the radical political philosophy of the next two centuries.
Nature does not work through hierarchy in Diderot’s understanding, and
the absolute demarcation of distinct species and beings is not possible in
Diderot’s conception of nature. The politics that such a natural philosophy
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suggests is one rooted in a need for a radical decentralization of power and
authority, and a fully bottom-up and egalitarian understanding of social
order. Also crucial is a fluid and flexible understanding of social structures
as entities forever changing and modifying through the ever flowing
movement of time. Although he never laid out a single utopian vision of
his model society, nor offered a fully elaborated statement of his political
philosophy, one sees it at work in his writings in his ever-persistent
critique of the necessity of established tradition and the institutions that
uphold it. It is also present in his continual return to a universal and all-
inclusive democratic base as the only foundation for any true conception
of the social order.
His deep convictions about the universal oneness and equality of humanity
is also manifest in his thinking about race and slavery, where he rejected
altogether the new anthropology promulgated by Kant and others that
spoke of biologically and civilizational distinct races of men scattered
around the world through a natural climatological division. Diderot
offered instead a monogenetic understanding of humanity composed from
beings whose differences were a matter of degree rather than kind. This
made him not only a critic of slavery and of racialized understandings of
history and politics, but a full-fledged abolitionist, one whose sensibilities
suggested, even if he never stated his explicit political commitments
directly, the proto-democratic positions that sat at the radical edge of the
political spectrum in the 1780s. Diderot nevertheless rarely sought to
connect his materialist metaphysical commitments with his political
thinking, not least due to his distaste for the way that his fellow materialist
La Mettrie produced an “immoralist” ethics and a cynical social theory.
Ultimately, Diderot was by nature a writer and thinker, not a political
activist, and his political philosophy stands in his writings as the least
developed aspect of his thought.
4.3 The Posthumous Legacy
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In his relation to politics, as in so many other ways, Diderot was different
from Voltaire, who always sustained his philosophy through his politics,
and who became more politically active as he aged. Diderot’s egalitarian
and proto-democratic political vision is best understood as part and parcel
of his life spent in pursuit of philosophical naturalism, and politically he
was akin to Rousseau, who also spent his twilight years in writerly
philosophic retreat. Yet when revolution erupted a decade later, the
memory of Voltaire and Rousseau was forged into a link tying the French
Enlightenment philosophes to the cause of revolutionary democracy. In
1792, when the First French Republic created the initial pantheon of
revolutionary heroes worthy of immortal commemoration, Voltaire and
Rousseau were chosen as the first inductees, while Diderot was at best
forgotten and at worst treated as a figure hostile to the new political
movements afoot.
This combination of neglect and outright hostility pushed Diderot to the
margins of French culture in the nineteenth century, and it would take
another century before retrospective interest in his work would be
renewed. A host of cultural forces conspired to make Diderot the least
interesting of the French Enlightenment philosophes in the minds of
nineteenth-century thinkers. Too systematically committed to his
materialism, too vigorous in his irreligion, and too passionate and
principled in his embrace of egalitarianism and universal democracy to be
acceptable to anyone with the slightest worry about the rising tides of
radical socialism and materialist freethought, Diderot became a pariah
within the nineteenth-century conservative reaction of the Victorian era in
Europe.
Unlike Spinoza, who famously had a complicated posterity in which he
was both the despicable atheist and the ‘God-drunken’ Romantic, Diderot
was viewed with suspicion for being some version of an Epicurean
materialist with immoralist tendencies. Goethe, who was fascinated with
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Diderot and translated the Neveu de Rameau into German, nevertheless
spoke in these terms when he decried Diderot’s lack of bourgeois
morality: “Oh wonderful Diderot, why do you always use your
considerable intellectual powers in the service of disorder rather than
order?” (1799 notes on Diderot’s Essai sur la peinture, in Goethe 1799
[1925: X, 144–145]). Such reductions of Diderot to nothing more than a
superficial and reckless subversive lasted a surprisingly long time, and a
continuous thread connects the French critic Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly’s
mid-nineteenth century declaration that Goethe was a genius while
Diderot was a shallow imitator with the characterization of Diderot found
in the Lagarde et Michard French literature textbook, a standard in French
high schools as late as the 1970s, which described his writing as “very
material”, which is to say coarse, physical, and bodily in nature, a trait that
made Diderot, and by extension his affectionate readers, predisposed to
materialism and base morality. Given his impropriety when judged by
nineteenth-century bourgeois values, it was perhaps not surprising that
after 1900 Soviet Marxists played a key role in reviving Diderot
scholarship (a process in which Lenin’s favorable discussion of the Rêve
de D’Alembert played a role). This was not merely through an attempt to
present French Enlightenment materialists like Helvétius or Diderot as
heroes of a kind of class struggle in philosophy avant la lettre, but also
through a serious and positive engagement with Diderot’s writings.
Diderot’s brilliant eclecticism, which made him neither a pure philosopher,
nor a straightforward litteraire, also made it hard for him to find a place in
the newly specializing terrain of nineteenth century thought. Too
innovative and idiosyncratic in his intellectual style to fit neatly into the
rigid grid of the new university-based disciplinary system, he failed to find
a home in this setting as well. Only after 1870 was interest in his work
revived, thanks in part to the new critical editions of his writings, which
made him newly available to scholars and readers, and to the changing
cultural and political climate, which made him newly relevant to
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contemporary concerns. Contemporary Diderot studies, which is thriving
today, was the result of that turn, and it is really only about a hundred
years old, with most of the foundational studies even younger than that.
The bulk of this work was accomplished by literary scholars, who tend to
treat Diderot as an avant-garde writer first and foremost, and only as a
philosopher in name and self-definition. Recently, however, scholars
attuned to the very different character of philosophy and science in the
eighteenth century have begun to return to Diderot’s work, and to find in it
the complex and sophisticated thinking that was his hallmark.
There was even a movement afoot as recently as 2013 to enshrine Diderot
alongside Rousseau, Voltaire, and Condorcet in the Panthéon of French
national heroes. Headlines worrying about “un homme dangereux au
Panthéon?” revealed the continuing influence of his alleged infamy, and in
other ways Diderot’s materialist philosophy continues to shape his
posthumous legacy in direct ways. The Diderot scholar Jacques Chouillet
recounted, for example, that during the discussions of this Pantheonization
it was suggested that Diderot’s remains be obtained in preparation for his
possible consecration in the French national monument. Chouillet,
however, explained that this was not possible because in the 1820s, when
structural repairs had been made to the Chapel of the Virgin in the Église
Saint-Roch, where Diderot was said to have been buried, workers found
no remains of Diderot in his grave. Further inquiries revealed that Diderot
had in fact been buried in this spot in a lead coffin in 1784, and that his
absence in the 1820s was the result of looting in 1794 during the
widespread search for lead needed to make bullets for the French
revolutionary armies then fighting to defend the First Republic from anti-
revolutionary invaders. With no extant material remains of Diderot to
consecrate, his Panthéonizaion was hindered, but in other ways, this
predicament might have been an appropriate end for a man who was fond
of distributed understandings of the relation between matter and life. What
better commemoration for Diderot, commented Chouillet, than the
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dispersion of his material ashes into the revolutionary tumult that he did so
much to stimulate? The material body of Diderot may be gone for ever,
but perhaps the most fitting remembrance for him, especially from the
perspective of his own materialist philosophy, is the memory of him
dissolved after his death into the spirit of his times (Chouillet 1991: 42).
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